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INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake triggered a massive tsunami
that devastated the Sendai region of Honshu Island, Japan,' and disrupted elec-
trical transmission to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Backup gen-
erators failed at all six reactors, causing a complete station blackout. Despite
circumstances for which they were entirely unprepared, including total dark-
ness inside the buildings, plant workers heroically attempted to maintain safety
equipment. Nonetheless, without electricity, essential cooling systems eventual-
ly failed, precipitating spent fuel pool fires, reactor fuel melting, hydrogen ex-
plosions, and major releases of radioactive materials.'
The Fukushima Dai-ichi accident gave a wake-up call to nuclear power
regulators around the globe. The sight of a devastating nuclear accident unfold-
ing in Japan-a technologically modern country viewed as having well-
developed nuclear safety programs-prompted the International Atomic Ener-
gy Agency and member countries to initiate review of the their own regulatory
programs. For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), post-
Fukushima review uncovered critical gaps in domestic reactor oversight and
prompted high level NRC managers to recommend broadly reforming the
agency's "patchwork" approach to create a "logical, systematic, and coherent
regulatory framework."3
Despite our collective hopes for rational, well-informed, and adaptive gov-
ernance, it often takes a large-scale catastrophe to prompt reevaluation of en-
trenched but maladaptive regulatory patterns. The accident and subsequent
analysis offer a teachable moment for U.S. nuclear power regulation and for
administrative law more broadly. Had the NRC embraced (or at least not un-
dercut) the decision-making model provided by the National Environmental
1. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING REACTOR
SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE REVIEW OF INSIGHTS
FROM THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI ACCIDENT 7, 9 (July 12, 2011) [hereinafter NTTF
REPORT].
2. Id.
3. Id. at 20-22.
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Policy Act (NEPA) and reflected in modern administrative law norms, U.S.
regulatory failures identified after Fukushima could have been remedied much
earlier. Instead, the agency's NEPA regulations and administrative procedures
undermined the agency's responsiveness to safety and environmental hazards in
three ways: (1) by blocking information from outside parties (including states
and other federal agencies), (2) by segregating information on interrelated is-
sues, and (3) by precluding licensing boards from considering individual plants'
unique risks.4 Because the federal courts' extreme deference toward the NRC
permitted and exacerbated these decision-making flaws, this specific case illu-
minates broader administrative law debates over judicial review of agency poli-
cy-making.
Since Fukushima, the NRC has now determined that U.S. licensees should
be much better prepared for severe accidents, station blackouts, earthquakes,
and other hazards.' Measures that the NRC now recognizes as critical to plant
safety in light of the post-Fukushima analyses had been raised years (and some-
times decades) earlier by commentators on rulemakings, intervenors in licens-
ing proceedings, and petitioners for regulatory action. Other federal agencies,
states, localities, individuals, and nonprofits repeatedly urged the agency to re-
consider its outdated or incomplete analysis of seismic risk,6 flooding hazards,
4. This Article bases these conclusions on analysis of numerous sources: NRC policy
statements and individual Commissioners' comments in voting records on those
policies (e.g., for station blackouts, severe accidents, and waste confidence); the
Fukushima Task Force Report, draft staff responses, Commission decisions re-
viewing staff proposals for responding to the Task Force Report, follow-up re-
ports from staff to the Commission providing updates on regulatory changes; let-
ters to licensees, incident reports, licensees' responses to NRC requests for
information; NRC adjudicative decisions by licensing boards, appeals boards, and
the five-member Commission, including dissents; the NRC staff Practice and Pro-
cedures Manual; draft and final NEPA regulations, draft and final environmental
impact statements and public comments; General Accountability Office Reports;
NRC internal review of prior regulations' effectiveness; and publications by the
NRC's history department.
5- R.W. Borchardt, Third 6-Month Status Update on Response to Lessons Learned from
Japan's March 11, 2o Great Tohoku Earthquake and Subsequent Tsunami,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N 2 (2013), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/commission/ secys/2o13/2o13-oo2oscy.pdf ("Safety enhancements at
nuclear power plants are being realized as implementation continues. For exam-
ple, issues identified during walkdowns of structures, systems, and components
that protect against seismic and flooding hazards are being corrected through li-
censee corrective action programs, and resolution is being monitored by the
NRC's resident inspectors .... Licensees have also procured many pieces of addi-
tional equipment that can be used to mitigate a prolonged station blackout.").
6. See, e.g., Ohio v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 814 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987) (find-
ing that the NRC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow state to inter-
vene and reopen licensing hearing issues regarding emergency planning to address
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plants' capability to withstand prolonged blackout,7 emergency core cooling
standards,8 and emergency planning to protect surrounding communities in the
event of a severe accident.9 In some cases the agency considered and rejected
these arguments. But more often, the NRC did not make any expertise-
informed judgment about these concerns. Instead, as described further below,
its hearing procedures and environmental review regulations simply prevented
these issues from being fully vetted. As it turns out, these were not trivial mat-
ters.
Like its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission, the NRC regulates in
a high-stakes context with many competing demands. Nuclear power plants are
expensive to build, complex to operate and maintain safely, and impossible to
move (at least the large types we now use). The plants supply approximately
twenty percent of U.S. electricity;"° if current licenses are allowed to expire,
these sources of low-carbon electricity will go offline. Absent financial and
regulatory inducements, plants' massive upfront investment costs will deter in-
vestors. Since the 1950s, the federal government has pushed private commercial
reactor development, while states, tribes, local governments, and individuals
often adamantly oppose facilities in their communities. Whether or not the
public accurately perceives the risk, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and now Fu-
kushima have made the potential for catastrophic accidents impossible to ig-
nore. Yet, from its origins as the Atomic Energy Commission, the agency has
new information from a 5.o Richter scale earthquake that occurred ten miles from
plant); San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 789
F.zd 26 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the NRC could exclude analysis of earth-
quakes as complicating factors in emergency evacuation planning required for li-
censing proceeding).
7. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zech, 846 F.2d 369 (6th Cir. 1988) (challenging the adequacy
of backup diesel generators in case of offsite power loss).
8. See, e.g., Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 513 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
9. See, e.g., Mass. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 924 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that the NRC could find an evacuation plan adequate without showing that it
could achieve minimum evacuation times and minimum radiation protection and
further allowing it to presume that state and local officials would assist utility with
emergency evacuation despite officials' purported refusal due to plan inadequa-
cies); Mass. v. NRC, 878 F.2d 1516 (ist Cir. 1989) (finding that NRC acceptance of
utility's emergency management plan and consequent authorization to restart nu-
clear power plant was not arbitrary and capricious despite Federal Emergency
Management Agency findings); State of Ohio v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 812
F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1987); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Suffolk County, N.Y., 628 F.
Supp. 654 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
iO. See Annual Energy Outlook with Projections to 2040, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 44
(2013), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/o383(2o13).pdf.
11. See J. SAMUEL WALKER, THREE MILE ISLAND: NUCLEAR CRISIS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 237-44 (2004).
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been pressured to simultaneously develop and promote new technology, ensure
its safety and economic viability, and to do this all very quickly."2
The agency has responded to these pressures by insulating itself from envi-
ronmental and safety input. As described below, the NRC's procedures make its
licensing decision-making almost impervious to public participation and limit
the effectiveness of dissenting voices from within. The agency's resistance to in-
put in its NEPA environmental review process appears unique or at least makes
it an outlier.13 Extreme judicial deference has supported this fortress culture.
The NRC's regulatory story provides important insights both for nuclear
power policy and for administrative law. Current debate over nuclear power's
potential contribution to a low-carbon energy future evaluates the technology
in isolation from its regulatory context. But the merits of any complex technol-
ogy can only be understood properly in connection with the laws that shape its
design and evolution. Nuclear power will be a better option in an improved
regulatory context. Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the NRC's
approach is particularly important given the necessity of long-term oversight of
nuclear reactors. Whether or not investors decide to continue building new re-
actors, the existing fleet will operate for at least the next two decades. When
these plants eventually close, the agency will oversee a decommissioning process
that lasts up to 6o years. On a pragmatic level, high-quality regulatory controls
are certainly preferable for public safety. Post-Fukushima review uncovered se-
rious omissions in reactor oversight that exposed the American public to un-
necessary risk.
Analysis of the NRC's decision-making also informs broader administrative
law debates. This Article argues that more rigorous judicial review of the NRC's
decisions and more stringent enforcement of NEPA procedures would improve
nuclear power regulation. This argument contradicts a well-respected body of
administrative law scholarship that perceives statutorily created analytical re-
quirements, judicially-imposed procedures, and hard look review to create "os-
12. See J. Samuel Walker & Thomas R. Wellock, A Short History of Nuclear Regulation
1946-2009, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N HISTORY DEP'T 2, 4 (2010). Walker and
Wellock describe how the commercial nuclear program began amidst fear that
"surrendering America's lead in expanding the peaceful applications of atomic
energy would deal a severe blow to its international prestige and world scientific
dominance." Id. at 2. See also Alice Buck, A History of the Energy Research and De-
velopment Administration, DEP'T OF ENERGY 4-5 (1982), http://energy.gov/sites/
prod/files/ERDA%2oHistory.pdf (describing the first national energy plan of 1975
as reflecting a "sense of urgency" based on the significant risks to the country if it
failed to quickly develop new energy supply sources, including nuclear power).
13. Indeed, one textbook on NEPA Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prepara-
tion uses the NRC's NEPA process in its first chapter as a case study of "how not
to prepare an EIS," describing it as a "lucid case study of unsound, flawed, and
even deceptive EIS management practices." CHARLES H. ECCLESTON, THE EIS
BOOK: MANAGING AND PREPARING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS 1 (2013).
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sification,"' 4 undermining agencies' ability to effectively and efficiently regu-
late.' 5 While this scholarship identifies important concerns applicable to many
regulatory contexts, the prevailing monolithic image of administrative agencies
obscures the need for institution-specific analysis. Agencies' approaches to poli-
cy decisions will vary substantially depending upon their unique histories, legal
mandates, structures, and organizational cultures, all of which affect the balance
struck between conflicting demands for efficiency, reasoned analysis, and par-
ticipation. In the NRC's case, insularity combines with extreme judicial defer-
ence to undermine the NRC's environmental and safety decision-making pro-
cesses.'6 Courts' deferential stance toward the agency has allowed it to create
14. See, e.g., JERRY MASHAW & DAVID HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 74-81,
172-291 (1990) (describing how auto manufacturers used administrative proce-
dures to block standards and how the threat of litigation caused the agency to
shift resources from engineering standards to legal defense); Thomas McGarity,
The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld,
75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 536 (1997) ("The stronger the insistence by the reviewing
courts on information, analysis, and logical reasoning, the less likely that the
agencies will be able to impose regulatory requirements upon unwilling regu-
lates."); Thomas McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Pro-
cess, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992) (arguing that judicial enforcement of new analytical
methods-many imposed at industry's request-leads to agency unresponsive-
ness); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review ofAgency Ac-
tion: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis in the 19905, 43
ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 8 (1991) (describing judicial review of Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission rulemakings as an important "indirect cause of the electricity short-
age" and claiming that "increasing evidence" shows that the powerful deterrent
created by judicial review has caused "policy paralysis" in other agencies as well).
Nonetheless, a good number of scholars continue to advocate hard look review ei-
ther generally or in specific contexts. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Preemption
Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction and the Quest for Stewardship and Inter-
generational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1557 (2009) ("[N]ormative goals
of encouraging agency transparency, accountability, and open process are fur-
thered by hard look review."); Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Admin-
istration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 945 (1996) (arguing that hard look review
"guard[s] against precisely the kinds of infidelities that lie at the core of the agency
cost problem in administrative law"); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Account-
ability: "Agency-Forcing" Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2181 (2009) (describing how
hard look review can "ensure that agencies disclose relevant data and provide rea-
soned responses to material objections raised during the rulemaking process");
Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 568-71 (2011)
(advocating "hard look" review of agency settlements).
15. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking, supra note 14, at 528.
16. The quality of administrative agencies' substantive decisions is difficult to meas-
ure, particularly for policy choices that do not have a "right answer," such as set-
ting risk tolerance or degrees of environmental harm to be traded against other
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information-blocking rules and procedures that defeat NEPA's primary pur-
pose: to have agencies incorporate environmental impact analysis into decision-
making.
An agency's response to competing demands will be reflected not only in
the substantive policies it produces but also in the procedures it adopts. Alt-
hough courts constrain agencies to exercise discretion within the bounds of
their statutory mandates, the judiciary gives administrators wide latitude in
choosing how to exercise the authority they do have." Despite significant varia-
tion in agencies' selection of regulatory instruments, i" we actually know very
little about how agencies choose from their many available tools and the sub-
stantive consequences of these choices. This Article examines the NRC as a case
study of agency policy decision-making processes, to illuminate the internal-
and often "invisible".-workings of administrative agencies. When brought to
light, these internal decision-making processes may help to refine our approach
to agency oversight and offer options better tailored to an agency's particular
situation.
This discussion proceeds as follows. Part I describes administrative law
principles that inform judicial deference to agencies. It discusses the "ossifica-
tion" claim that statutorily imposed decision procedures, such those created by
NEPA, and hard look judicial review impede agency experts from efficiently
and effectively regulating. It argues that overly-broad claims about ossification
fail to account for the diversity of agency cultures and regulatory activities, as
well as the potential corrective function of public input and judicial review. It
then explains how NEPA offers similar correctives if properly applied.
Part II describes the NRC's regulatory setting, beginning with conflicting
political imperatives to both promote and regulate private commercial reactors.
It then analyzes the courts' extreme deference to the NRC, a view locked in by
two Supreme Court cases, Vermont Yankee"° and Baltimore Gas21, that have
shaped judicial review in NEPA cases and broader administrative law doctrine.
It explains how the "scientific" judgment to which the Supreme Court deferred
in Baltimore Gas actually had little to do with scientific or technical expertise
values. Nonetheless, this difficulty should not prevent scholars from seeking ways
to assess agency judgments. In this case, the Fukishima accident highlights the in-
adequacy of the decision process within the NRC that blocks relevant input.
17. See generally Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1383, 1403-04 (2004) (describing the multiple forms available to most agen-
cies and the "orthodox" doctrine that courts will not interfere with agency
choice).
18. See id. at 1386-87.
19. Jerry L. Mashaw, The American Model of Federal Administrative Law: Remember-
ing the First One Hundred Years, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 975, 976 (2010).
2o. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 435 U.S. 519
(1978).
21. Bait. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
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but consisted largely of crystal ball predictions about future political and legal
developments. It then describes the Fukushima Near Term Task Force (Task
Force) recommendations and subsequent changes adopted by the Commission.
Part III illustrates how the NRC's choice of procedures, both for licensing
hearings and NEPA review, blocked experts from receiving and acting upon
important safety and environmental information. These combined limits un-
dermined standards for spent fuel, reactor accidents, earthquakes, emergency
planning, and station blackout-the very issues reconsidered in light of Fuku-
shima. Part IV argues that critical lessons from Fukushima have yet to reach the
NRC-as illustrated by continued use of information-blocking procedures that
favor expeditious licensing over environmental and safety values. It then dis-
cusses the role that more stringent judicial review could play in shifting this
perspective.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND NEPA
A. Trans-substantive Principles and Deference
Enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act" (APA) and other legal de-
velopments in the mid-twentieth century transformed administrative law from
"the artifact of particular statutes and practices within individual agencies" to a
set of laws based on "trans-substantive legislation and judicial interpreta-
tions."23 Modern American administrative law is characterized by norms sup-
porting public participation, governmental transparency, rational legislative
rulemaking supported by reasoned analysis, and procedural fairness.2 4 The APA
enshrines these values with procedural requirements for notice and comment
rulemaking, disclosure provisions, mandated opportunities for public participa-
tion, and trial-like procedures for adjudicative decisions. These requirements,
in turn, "are viewed as central to achieving administrative legitimacy and thus
justifying judicial deference." 5 Administrative agencies are understood to have
the time and expertise to implement Congress's intent. 6 This vision of agency
expertise frames their legal relationship with courts.
Indeed, Douglas Ginsburg describes judicial deference to administrative
agencies as the "hallmark" of the U.S. system of administrative law, as evi-
22. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (2012).
23. Mashaw, supra note 19, at 980-81.
24. Id. at 981.
25. Brietta Clark, APA Deference After Independent Living Center: Why Informal Adju-
dicatory Action Needs a Hard Look, 102 KY. L.J. 211, 214 (2013-14).
26. Id. at 229-30 ("[Gliven their expertise and accountability to the executive, agen-
cies are in a better position than courts to fill in legislative gaps that involve value
judgments and the balancing of policy goals.").
27. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Appellate Courts and Independent Experts, 60 CASE W. REs.
L. REV. 303, 317 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
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denced by lenient Chevron review of agencies' statutory interpretations, the
indulgent substantial evidence standard for factual determinations, and "arbi-
trary and capricious" review of policymaking and other actions. 29 These stand-
ards provide efficiency and legitimacy because "agencies ... develop expertise in
the field or industry they are charged with regulating."3 Moreover, because
statutes often require administrative decisions to resolve conflicts between
"competing and often wholly incommensurable values," deference places these
policy decisions in the hands of agencies that, unlike courts, have at least indi-
rect political accountability."
This deferential stance extends to procedural choices as well. So long as
agencies meet the basic requirements of their organic statutes, the APA, and the
Constitution, they may create their own hearing procedures, choose quite freely
between adjudication and rulemaking,32 select among a range of formal or in-
formal enforcement mechanisms, and can often choose not to regulate at all.33
Although respect for agency expertise broadly undergirds legal rules shaping
courts' review of agency substantive and procedural decisions, academic and
judicial perspectives on the appropriate degree of deference have vacillated over
time, as described in the next section.
B. Expertise and Ossification
Although deference to expertise continues to broadly frame legal rules, his-
torical review shows shifting trends in scholars' and judges' view of agencies'
ability and willingness to address social problems. In the New Deal era, scholars
and judges optimistically presumed that agencies' apolitical expertise would
28. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Un-
der Chevron, courts will uphold "permissible" agency interpretations of ambigu-
ous statutory text. Id. at 866.
29. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(2012).
30. Ginsburg, supra note 27, at 319; see also Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion:
The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1507 (1983) (describing agency experts' under-
standing of policy matters as superior to generalist judges).
31. Ginsburg, supra note 27, at 319.
32. See NLRB v. Bell Aeropspace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) ("[T]he choice between
rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board's discre-
tion."); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (Chenery II) ("[T]he choice
made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one
that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency."). See
also Magill, supra note 17.
33. See Adrian Vermeule & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of 'Not Now': When Agencies
Defer Decisions, 103 GEO. L. REv. 157, 161-62 (2014) (describing the broad discretion
that agencies enjoy to defer regulation but identifying three specific limitations).
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bring the benefits of rational technocratic problem solving to public policy.3 4
Yet it soon became apparent that agencies were not merely mechanically apply-
ing science to definitive congressional mandates but were drawn into discre-
tionary balancing among competing values.35
During the 1950s and 196os, observers questioned the lack of democratic
representation in value-laden agency policymaking, and critics raised the spec-
ter of regulatory capture.36 In light of these concerns and the expanding role of
administrative agencies, all three branches began imposing public participation
and analytic requirements during the 1970s; these "outside-in" approaches to
agency decision-making (including NEPA) aimed to ensure that agency deci-
sions were rational and considered relevant values.3 7
Judicial constraints upon agency policy-making discretion are reflected in
the development of the "hard look" doctrine, which ratcheted up judicial inter-
rogation of the basis for policymaking decisions under the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard. The D.C. Circuit's decision in Greater Boston Television Corp. v.
FCC"s reflects this view. Given agencies' broad powers to "select policies
deemed in the public interest," the courts should ensure that agencies' judg-
ments properly considered "all material facts and issues" in a well-reasoned
manner:
This calls for insistence that the agency articulate with reasonable clari-
ty its reasons for decision, and identify the significance of the crucial
facts, a course that tends to assure that the agency's policies effectuate
general standards, applied without unreasonable discrimination.... Its
supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not merely in case
34. See Richard P. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1695 (1975). The New Deal era saw a strong faith in the apoliti-
cal bureaucratic application of expertise to social problems. See James 0. Freed-
man, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 364 (1976)
("Those who rationalized the New Deal's regulatory initiatives regarded expertise
and specialization as the particular strengths of the administrative process.").
35. Stewart, supra note 34, at 1684 (" [Blroad legislative directives will rarely dispose of
particular cases once the relevant facts have been accurately ascertained. More
frequently, the application of legislative directives requires the agency to reweigh
and reconcile the often nebulous or conflicting policies behind the directives in
the context of a particular factual situation with a particular constellation of af-
fected interests. The required balancing of policies is an inherently discretionary,
ultimately political procedure .... Such choices clearly do not turn on technical
issues that can safely be left to the experts.").
36. See MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
(1955).
37. See Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of Ad-
ministrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
463 (2012).
38. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
332
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of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the legisla-
tive charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially
from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really
taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely en-
gaged in reasoned decision-making.3 9
Many scholars have criticized the hard look doctrine for impeding efficient
use of informal rulemaking, thus ossifying rules.4° Important to this critique is
the belief that notice-and-comment rulemaking provides a better regulatory
tool for agency policymaking than adjudication because it promotes efficiency,
public participation, and predictability. 4' Lisa Bressman aptly summarizes the
reasons for this commonly held preference as follows:
Notice-and-comment rulemaking, by its nature, facilitates the partici-
pation of affected parties, the submission of relevant information, and
the prospective application of the resulting policy. As a result of the
reasoned decision-making requirement that accompanies it, notice-
and-comment rulemaking fosters logical and thorough consideration
of policy. To the extent notice-and-comment rulemaking issues general
rules that rely for their enforcement on further proceedings, it also
promotes predictability.42
Concern with preserving the benefits of rulemaking prompted calls for a
shift back to a more deferential judicial stance towards agency decision-making.
Proponents of the ossification thesis blame judicial misinterpretation of the
APA's concise general statement rule for spawning an era of voluminous and
encyclopedic rulemaking records that agencies prophylactically develop to de-
fend against anticipated review.43 The time and resources required for such rec-
ord-making bogs the agency down, making it more difficult to respond to im-
mediate issues and to update rules as new information arises. Moreover, the
sheer volume of comments submitted on proposed rulemaking prevents "over-
stretched agency staff" from getting to their most important jobs: "The law does
39. Id. at 851.
40. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 14; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is
Real. A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493,
1496-97 (2012).
41. See William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, The Importance of Facts, and the Limi-
tation of Labels, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 383 (2000) ("Agency use of adjudica-
tion to establish a rule may well deprive subsequent defendants of any meaningful
participation right .... ); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrar-
iness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 541 (2003)
(summarizing this literature); Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the
Rule of Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 647, 649 (20o8).
42. Bressman, supra note 41, at 541-42.
43. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 40, at 14oo; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems
in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Ju-
dicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L. J. 300, 309.
333
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not permit the agency to shield itself from this flood of information and focus
on developing its own expert conception of the project." 44 Worse, some critics
contend that the very participation requirements intended to give the public ac-
cess to agency decision-making disproportionately favor regulated industries
and allow them to impede administrators' oversight.45
Proponents of the ossification thesis laud the Supreme Court's decision in
Vermont Yankee 46 for reigning in a Circuit Court trend towards increasing pro-
cedural requirements for informal rulemaking under the APA.47 This seminal
decision held that courts should defer to agencies' decision not to provide addi-
tional procedures for notice-and-comment rulemaking beyond statutory min-
imums.4' Thus, the APA provided the "maximum procedural requirements
which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in con-
ducting rulemaking procedures." 49 In addition to the APA, the opinion cited
historical deference to agencies' procedural choices: "[T]his Court has for more
than four decades emphasized that the formulation of procedures was basically
to be left within the discretion of the agencies to which Congress had confided
the responsibility for substantive judgments.""
The Court explained that agency discretion to set procedures stemmed
from Congress's "determination that administrative agencies and administra-
tors will be familiar with the industries which they regulate and will be in a bet-
ter position than federal courts or Congress itself to design procedural rules
adapted to the peculiarities of the industry and the tasks of the agency in-
volved."5 This delegation of authority extended to "the scope of the inquiry,
whether applications should be heard contemporaneously or successively,
whether parties should be allowed to intervene in one another's proceedings
44. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1325 (2010).
45. See Pierce, supra note 43, at 309; see also McGarity (1997) supra note 14 ("The
stronger the insistence by the reviewing courts on information, analysis, and logi-
cal reasoning, the less likely that the agencies will be able to impose regulatory re-
quirements upon unwilling regulates."); McGarity (1992) (arguing that judicial
enforcement of new analytical methods-many imposed at industry's request-
leads to agency unresponsiveness).
46. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
47. Pierce, supra note 40, at 1500 (describing Vermont Yankee as a "landmark deossi-
fying opinion").
48. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524 ("Agencies are free to grant additional procedural
rights in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free
to impose them if the agencies have chosen not to grant them.").
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 525 (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965)).
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and similar questions."52 In other words, agencies are given free reign over a
broad range of procedures. The Court described the rule that agencies "should
be free to fashion their own rules of procedure" as a "very basic tenet of admin-
istrative law.""
Dueling analyses of Vermont Yankee's impact appeared in a 1978 Harvard
Law Review symposium. Then-Professor Stephen Breyer condoned the Court's
restriction on judicially- imposed procedures but criticized statements allowing
the Court of Appeals to require record supplementation on remand." He feared
that this excessive intrusion into agency processes would allow courts to make
value determinations better left to the agency. 5
In contrast, Richard Stewart criticized Vermont Yankee's bar on judicially-
created procedural innovations for leaving agencies with outdated APA proce-
dures unsuited to the modern demands on agencies56 Given the APA's binary
choice of policymaking options, administrators facing greater workloads had
increasingly shifted from the APA's cumbersome trial-like procedures for case-
by-case adjudication to reliance to notice and comment rulemaking.57 By re-
quiring agencies to support their rules with greater evidentiary records than the
APA explicitly required, courts had managed to accommodate administrative
workloads while addressing concerns that agencies could not fairly and wisely
balance social values5' He hoped that the salutary development of hybrid rule-
making would not be entirely undermined by Vermont Yankee.5 9
Although Vermont Yankee is most frequently cited for its limitation on ju-
dicially-mandated procedures, Breyer's fears and Stewart's hopes reflect a sec-
ond legacy: acceptance of the judicial role in ensuring that agencies develop an
adequate substantive record. The inconsistencies between these two aspects of
the decision left room for the Supreme Court to endorse an apparent version of
the hard look standard in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company6 ° when it required the agency to "exam-
ine the relevant data and to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice
52. Id. (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940)).
53. Id. at 543, 544.
54. Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Con-
troversy, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1833 (1978).
55. Id. (stating that judges were "intruding too deeply upon the administrative pro-
cess perhaps without full realization of their implicit premises or of the potential
consequences").
56. Richard Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure,
91 HARV. L. REV. 18o5, 1811 (1978).
57. Id. at 1811-12.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1816, 1821.
60. 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983).
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made." 6 ' The Court explained that decisions will normally be arbitrary and ca-
pricious where the agency
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, en-
tirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference
in view or the product of agency expertise.62
Some scholars have urged the Court to eliminate hard look review altogeth-
er, along with other legal doctrines that purportedly violate the spirit of Ver-
mont Yankee.6 3 Richard J. Pierce, for example, argues that hard look review
"arose through the same kind of arrogant and illegitimate judicial decision-
making process that spawned the practice the Court condemned in Vermont
Yankee."6 4 Like other adherents to the ossification thesis, Pierce aims to reduce
unpredictable litigation delays and preserve the benefits of informal rulemak-
ing.6"
C. When Hard Look Review Looks Good
While socially beneficial rulemakings have no doubt sometimes been de-
layed or scuttled by ossifying procedures, the prevailing monolithic image of
agencies has led scholars to make overly broad recommendations. Proponents
of the ossification thesis have highlighted cases in which burdensome proce-
dures and rigorous judicial review blocked agencies from addressing important
health and safety issues.66 However, significant variations in agencies' struc-
tures, mandates, cultures, and degrees of political accountability inevitably will
shape their approaches to policy decisions. Policymaking will reflect this unique
background as well as each agency's response to tensions between conflicting
61. Id. at 43.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV, and V? A Re-
sponse to Beerman and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 903 (2007); Paul
Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 55
TUL. L. REV. 418, 419-21 (1981).
64. Pierce, supra note 63, at 906.
65. Id. at 9o9-1o. Pierce sees one exception to this litigation unpredictability in the
extent to which case outcomes reflect the predictable political preferences of the
reviewing panel. Id.
66. See, e.g., MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 14; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to
Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 61 (1995) (describing the "im-
possible plight of agencies charged with the responsibility to promulgate rules
concerning environmental protection, health and safety, and economic regula-
tion" and judicial reversal of expensive and time-consuming EPA and OSHA
rulemakings designed to limit exposure to hazardous and toxic substances).
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theoretical and practical goals. In the NRC's case, overemphasis on expeditious
licensing prompted the agency to adopt regulations that prevent staff and li-
censing boards from utilizing relevant data in decision-making. Judicial acqui-
escence to the NRC's procedural choices in the name of agency expertise, thus
ironically undercuts the very values that such deference seeks to preserve.
Agencies also employ informal rulemaking for a diverse range of activities.
As described in Part III, the NRC has used rulemaking not only to establish reg-
ulatory standards and set policies, but also to shift power from independent li-
censing boards to agency staff, to constrain public participation in licensing
proceedings, and to undermine NEPA analysis. Moreover, the NRC has used
rulemaking to impose a backfitting rule upon itself, limiting the agency's ability
to impose updated standards on licensees. 67
Broad claims about expertise can mask the fact that an agency's official pol-
icy rarely reflects a single and obvious option reached by consensus among ex-
perts. Different branches, divisions, and individuals often disagree, and the offi-
cial statement represents either a compromise or a victory by one contingent.
Courts' reification of the final product as the expert opinion masks internal dis-
sent over substance and power struggles over procedures. As a practical matter,
courts obviously must review a single and final policy statement and not re-
weigh matters sufficiently evaluated at the agency level. However, excessive ju-
dicial deference can privilege particular contingents and allow agency proce-
dures to shift the policy balance. Thus, instead of incorporating multiple Con-
gressional concerns-economic efficiency, environmental protection, public
safety, technology promotion-an agency may respond to external (non-
judicial) pressure by jettisoning some values in favor of others. Extreme defer-
ence permits the analysis to become quite skewed.68 In the NRC's case, the
agency has increasingly adopted procedures for licensing hearings and NEPA
review that limit information available to agency experts in the service of
prompt licensing. However final decisions appear from the outside, develop-
ment of the reactor licensing scheme has been fraught with internal and exter-
nal conflict.6 9 Fukushima and its aftermath have shown the regulatory regime
that evolved from this process to be deeply flawed.
One need not attribute regulatory failures to improper influences to sup-
port hard look review. Insights from cognitive psychology suggest that even
well-intentioned governmental actors often choose poorly among policy op-
tions because human psychology generates cognitive errors.7" Indeed, the same
expertise that enable agencies to resolve issues efficiently can also lead to irra-
67. 10 C.F.R. § 5o.lo9. Implications of this regulation are discussed further in Section
II.A.
68. See Section II.C infra.
69. See WALKER, supra note ii, at 40-43.
70. Jeffrey Rachlinski & Cynthia Farina, Cognitive Government and Optimal Govern-
ment Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 562-63 (2002).
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tional decisions.7' The human tendency towards overconfidence in one's own
judgment can be exaggerated in experts, who are "often wrong but rarely in
doubt."72 Moreover, experts may deploy a particularly narrow analytical per-
spective due to their "tend[ency] to have great faith that their profession has
identified most of the problems they are likely to face." 73 Experts can suffer
from tunnel vision, "myopically focus[ing] on issues within their area of exper-
tise and thereby fail[ing] to recognize that a decision would benefit from access-
ing other bodies of knowledge or ways of thinking.
74
Despite employing procedures such as formalized risk modeling that re-
duce cognitive error, agency decision-making may be plagued with biases. Cass
Sunstein and Reid Hastie argue that group deliberation processes within large
institutions can "amplify" individual cognitive errors, deterring individuals
from sharing unique information and pushing groups to more extreme posi-
tions.75 Organizational structures that functionally segregate related infor-
mation across time or between departments can further impede recognition of
interacting risk factors. As John Darley has described in the products liability
context, although an organization may collectively have sufficient information,
"because the information is not pulled together and put in front of a competent
individual, the organization can be said not to know that the product is harm-ful."176
While they do not contend that lawmakers designed the APA to remedy
these decision-making biases, Jeffrey Rachlinski and Cynthia Farina argue that
twentieth-century administrative law developments, particularly increased pub-
lic participation and judicial review, provide useful antidotes to cognitive biases
and judgment errors. Public participation combined with hard look judicial re-
view can reduce expert overconfidence and tunnel vision by requiring agencies
to articulate reasons for their decisions and to explain rejection of alternative
approaches.77 Moreover, public participation introduces multiple perspectives
71. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 491-508 (2002).
72. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 70, at 560.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Ilana Ritov,
Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (2002).
75. See Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, Garbage in, Garbage out? Some Micro Sources
of Macro Errors, I. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 2-4 (2014) (describing how group delib-
eration can aggravate individual cognitive biases due to informational signals and
social pressures).
76. John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES
OF CONDUCT 17 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
77. Rachlinksi and Farina, supra note 70 at 588-89.
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into policy analysis and gives experts feedback, including critiques that may not
be heard from others within the agency due to groupthink or social pressure.7
Because it enables public participation, structures the scope and manner of
decision-procedures, and requires reasoned analysis, NEPA can similarly reduce
cognitive biases if properly applied. While this Article does not attribute specific
decisions to identified biases, it does argue that the NRC's regulatory choices
exacerbate the risk that cognitive biases will influence its decisions. As described
further below, the NRC disaggregates decision-making in a manner that im-
pedes recognition of potentially critical interactions between issues such as
spent fuel storage and accident risk, severe accidents and natural hazards, as
well as earthquakes and emergency planning. Barriers to participation and lim-
its on licensing boards' scope of investigation reduce the likelihood that these
interactions will be recognized. The Commission's generic findings preclude
plant-specific analysis of environmental impacts, increasing the risk that over-
confident or time-pressured staff will overlook a plant's unique hazards. Con-
sistent judicial enforcement of NEPA procedures could help to counteract these
risks by requiring interdisciplinary evaluation of a range of impacts, considera-
tion of alternatives, and engagement with public comments. However, as ex-
plained in Part III, thus far the NRC has structured its decision-making in ways
that undermine NEPA's benefits. The judiciary has overwhelmingly deferred to
the agency's choices, treating these as procedural decisions appropriately left to
the choice of agency experts.
The Supreme Court's conflation of substantive expertise with procedural
prowess in Vermont Yankee presumed that an agency's scientific experts are also
better positioned to create decision-making procedures. But an agency's choice
of procedures does not merely implement foregone substantive judgments. Ra-
ther, procedural choices shape substantive policy in underappreciated ways: by
framing or limiting information available to future decision-makers and deter-
mining the potential for alternative viewpoints (from external critics of policy
proposals or internal dissenters) to be heard. 9 Adoption of apparently proce-
dural rules can reflect substantive decisions to have future policy judgments fa-
vor certain values at the expense of others. Moreover, in the NRC's case, the
courts have deferred on decisions far afield from the agency's technical exper-
tise.8" Finally, to the extent agencies suffer from common decision-making er-
rors, extreme deference undermines potential correctives that public participa-
tion and judicially-enforced administrative NEPA analysis could offer.
78. See Sunstein & Hastie, supra note 75, at 2.
79. See, e.g., SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK (1984) (describing how
judicial review of agency analysis under NEPA empowered a new cadre of envi-
ronmental analysts within agencies); see also William Pederson, Formal Records
and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 59-60 (1975).
8o. See discussion of Vermont Yankee and Baltimore Gas, infra Section II.B.
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D. The National Environmental Policy Act
Modern administrative law norms of transparency, participation, and ra-
tionalized process are epitomized in NEPA. Among its few express provisions,
NEPA mandates that federal agencies prepare a detailed environmental impact
statement (EIS) for "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment."8 ' The EIS process requires agencies to study the envi-
ronmental impacts of proposed activities, compare each proposal with alterna-
tive approaches, and consider mitigation measures to reduce any significant
impacts. NEPA requires agencies to evaluate this information before deciding to
undertake discretionary2 actions, including adopting regulations and approv-
ing private activities, such as licensing nuclear power plants.8"
Once a proposal triggers NEPA review, the depth of required analysis de-
pends upon the likelihood that the action will cause significant environmental
impacts.8 4 For many projects that will undoubtedly cause adverse effects, agen-
cies initiate review with the full EIS process. However, NEPA allows agencies to
forgo this in-depth study under two circumstances. First, agencies may exclude
entire categories of recurring actions (such as non-substantive corrections to
contracts) from review if they have been found through notice and comment
81. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). The Act mandates that
all agencies of the Federal Government shall ... include in every rec-
ommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, a detailed statement ... on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented."
Id.
82. See Dep't of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004) (holding that, be-
cause the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration lacked discretion to con-
trol cross-border operations of Mexican-domiciled motor carriers, the agency had
no duty under NEPA to evaluate impacts in promulgating safety inspection regu-
lations that would precede lifting of presidential moratorium).
83. See 40 C.F.R. § 15o8.8(b) (describing the categories of actions that fall within
NEPA as including "adoption of regulations" and "approval of specific projects,
such as construction or management activities located in a defined geographic ar-
ea ... includ[ing] actions approved by permit or other regulatory decision").
84. Many factors can affect a finding of significance. See 40 C.F.R. § 15o8.27.
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rulemaking to have no significant environmental impacts."s As discussed below,
over the last few decades the NRC increasingly deployed categorical exclusions
to limit analyses of arguably important issues.
Second, projects that are not categorically exempted may nonetheless be
individually excused from full EIS preparation requirements based upon more
limited, preliminary analysis in a concise "environmental assessment" (EA)
document.8 6 If the EA shows the action will have no significant impacts, the
agency may issue a "finding of no significant impact" (FONSI) briefly explain-
ing its decision and concluding NEPA proceedings.8s However, if the EA reveals
any potentially significant impacts, the agency must then prepare a full EIS.
Courts review an agency's decision not to prepare an EIS under the arbitrary
and capricious standard."'
The EIS process promotes public participation and reasoned analysis
through several mechanisms. The agency must begin with a "scoping" process,
soliciting public and outside agency input on the range of impacts for study s9
The lead agency then produces a draft EIS predicting the proposed action's en-
vironmental impacts and comparing impacts under alternative approaches.9°
After circulating the draft EIS, the agency issues a final EIS that must include
responses to governmental and public comments. The final EIS explains chang-
es or new analyses stemming from this outside input and gives reasons for re-
jecting other comments. To be adequate, the final EIS must provide a "full and
fair discussion of significant environmental impacts" and inform "decision
makers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or min-
imize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment." 9' The
agency provides a "record of decision" explaining its choice among alternatives
and its reasons for rejecting environmentally preferable alternatives or mitiga-
tion. 92 NEPA's central purpose-for thorough analysis of environmental im-
pacts to inform decision-makers before they commit to discretionary actions-
is evident in the timing requirements. NEPA requires agencies to begin analyz-
ing environmental impacts early enough for the analysis to "serve practically as
85. See 40 C.F.R. § 15o8.4.
86. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3-1501.4. The EA, a "concise public document," discusses the
need for and alternatives to the proposed action, as well as the environmental im-
pacts of both the action and its potential alternatives. 40 C.F.R. § 15o8.9.
87. 40 C.F.R. §§ 15o8.9(a)(1), 15o8.13.
88. See Dep't of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 763 (2004).
89. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7(a).
90. NEPA provides that federal agencies must, to the fullest extent possible, "[s]tudy,
develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action
in any proposal.... 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (2012).
91. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1.
92. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2.
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an important contribution to the decision-making process" and to ensure that
it "will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already made."93
A decade after its passage, the Supreme Court interpreted NEPA to be an
"essentially procedural" statute.94 Consequently, the courts will not second-
guess the agency final selection among alternatives because NEPA does not
mandate "that agencies achieve particular substantive environmental results."95
Courts review NEPA decisions under the APA's arbitrary and capricious stand-
ard and require agencies to take a "hard look" at impacts. 6 Courts should en-
sure that federal agencies "consider every significant aspect of the environmen-
tal impact" of the proposed action, and "inform the public that it has indeed
considered environmental concerns in its decision-making process."97 A hard
look under NEPA requires the agency to consider "all foreseeable direct and in-
direct impacts" ' including the cumulative "incremental impact[s] of the action
when added to past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions."99
Despite interpreting NEPA to preclude judicial review of an agency's sub-
stantive policy choices, the Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed optimism
that NEPA can rationalize the decision-making process and infuse it with envi-
ronmental values. The Court claims that NEPA will "inject environmental con-
siderations into the federal agency's decision-making process"'0 0 and "inte-
grate"'"' these concerns with that decision-making. The Court presumes that
NEPA will "ensure[] that the agency.., will have available, and will carefully
consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental im-
pacts." ' 2
Literature on NEPA and its progeny often posits that that environmental
impact assessment creates a fundamental cultural shift that makes agencies
more protective of the environment than they would be otherwise. 3 Despite
93. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5.
94. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
558 (1978).
95. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989).
96. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1973).
97. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983)
(quoting Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2012).
98. Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 2002).
99. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7.
loo. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143
(1981).
lOl. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979).
102. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (emphasis
added).
103. JANE HOLDER, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: THE REGULATION OF DECISION-
MAKING 23 (2006).
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the difficulty of broadly measuring the statute's impacts given the impossibility
of comparison with a NEPA-free control decision, the statute has no doubt im-
proved environmental judgments in many instances.0 4 Prior to NEPA, some
federal agencies (notably the Atomic Energy Commission) explicitly refused to
consider environmental impacts, arguing that these concerns exceeded their au-
thority. Even those agencies that did consider environmental impacts (either
sua sponte or in response to public pressure) often conducted haphazard re-
views.0 5 By unequivocally requiring agencies to consider these impacts and by
creating the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to further NEPA's poli-
cies,106 the statute advanced both environmental awareness and systematic anal-
ysis.
Scholars contend that data gathering procedures reduce potential informa-
tional biases and render decisions more rational.0 7 NEPA aims to improve
agency decision-making in several ways. The statute expressly mandates "a sys-
tematic, interdisciplinary approach"'O' NEPA requires the agency to integrate
analyses of multiple issues in a single EIS, making it harder to separate issues
over time. Issue segregation is further discouraged by a broad definition of en-
vironmental effects and mandated analysis of cumulative impacts. The re-
quirement that EIS preparation precede decision-making reduces momentum
behind proposals with poorly-understood impacts. NEPA's mandate that agen-
cies consider alternatives and mitigation measures further broadens decision
options.
104. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 79 at 130 ("There is no question that all [Army Corps
of Engineers] districts and (Forest Service] forests do better in terms of avoiding
environmental damage than they did before NRPA."); Richard Lazarus, The Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act in the United States Supreme Court: A Reappraisal
and a Peek Behind the Curtains, loo GEO. L.J. 1507, 1586 (2012) ("Even in ruling
against environmental plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has promoted a view of
NEPA that, in important respects, is likely far greater than its drafters envisioned
at the time. The Act has already had a profound and important impact on federal
agency decision making.").
105. See TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 8-13. Prior to NEPA's enactment, the likelihood that
the environment would be considered at all depended on the vagaries of chance-
that information would come to light and someone would have sufficient interest
and power to require its examination.
1O6. See 42 U.S.C. § 4341-47 (2012). The statute directs the CEQ to "assist and advise"
the President, "review and appraise" federal programs in pursuit of NEPA's goals,
and to "develop and recommend policies to foster and promote improvement of
environmental quality." 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (2o12). The CEQ's NEPA regulations
have been held to be binding on federal agencies, including independent Com-
missions. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (describing the CEQ's
NEPA regulations as applying to "all federal agencies").
107. HOLDER, supra note 103, at 284.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (2012).
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Although NEPA provides tools for improving decision-making and pushes
agencies to incorporate environmental concerns into policy judgment, it does
not guarantee sound analysis. °9 Despite its place in a trans-substantive vision of
administrative law, NEPA's effectiveness varies by context and agency culture.
One comparative study concluded that environmental impact assessment is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for improving agencies' incorporation of
environmental values into decision-making.' ° Because "every EIA [Environ-
mental Impact Assessment] procedure operates within a political, legal, admin-
istrative and policy context peculiar to the jurisdiction . . . [tlo successfully
achieve real shifts in the weight given to environmental impacts, the EIA proce-
dure must interact positively with its jurisdictional context ....
As seasoned NEPA practitioner Charles Eccleston described the domestic
impact of the statute, "most agencies have made substantial strides in learning
to comply with NEPA and its EIS requirements. Despite Congress's clear con-
gressional intent and more than 40 years of operating experience, however, a
few agencies still have not learned the lessons.".. 2 In addition to statutory re-
quirements, case law, and CEQ's guidelines, an agency's own NEPA regulations
govern its process. As described below, the NRC's NEPA regulations limit the
depth of investigation for licensing decisions by emphasizing generic factual de-
terminations through rulemaking, over-utilizing categorical exclusions, and
narrowing the scope relicensing proceedings. These policies combine to con-
strain information flow and exacerbate the potential for information disaggre-
gation within the organization. In the NRC's case, a few judicially enforced ex-
amples of regulatory improvement can be seen, but generally the agency
undermines NEPA potential by disassembling information, precluding consid-
eration of individualized plant circumstances in licensing proceedings, and gen-
erally attempting to buffer itself from external input. Indeed, the NRC serves as
Eccelston's model of "how not to prepare an EIS.""3 However, if properly exe-
cuted, environmental review could improve agency decision-making by provid-
lo9. See, e.g., Dinah Bear, Some Modest Suggestions for Improving Implementation of the
National Environmental Policy Act, 43 NAT. RESOURCES L.J. 931, 935 (2003); Roger
C. Crampton & Richard K. Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water: NEPA and the Fed-
eral Bureaucracy, 71 MICH. L. REv. 511, 536 (1973). NEPA analysis can also be exe-
cuted poorly through overkill, burying decision-makers in unhelpful data and
wasting time and money.
110. CHRISTOPHER WOOD, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A COMPARATIVE
REVIEW 7-8 (2003).
ill. Id. at 8 (also discussing other reviews of EIA effectiveness).
112. CHARLES H. ECCLESTON, THE EIS BOOK: MANAGING AND PREPARING
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS xxxii (2014).
113. Id. at i. The first chapter of this lengthy book on EIS best practices is entitled "Sci-
entific facades: How not to prepare an EIS." The chapter describes the NRC's
NEPA process as "disingenuous," id. at 9, and contends that mismanagement of
environmental review imposes safety risks on the public, id. at ii.
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ing analytical checks, creating an occasion for assembling disaggregated
knowledge, and sometimes introducing high quality information.
II. THE SETTING FOR NUCLEAR REGULATION
A. Political Context
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 established the NRC's predecessor, the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and authorized it to oversee development
of the country's first fleet of privately-owned commercial nuclear reactors.
114
The 1954 Act charged the AEC with both regulating and promoting the develop-
ment of commercial nuclear power."5 Criticism of the AEC's potentially con-
flicting roles prompted passage of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. The
1974 statute established the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, authorizing it to
regulate civilian nuclear technology while shifting development and promotion
activities to other agencies."6 Nonetheless, the NRC's organizational culture
continues to reflect a promotional stance towards nuclear power, and some
scholars believe that this perspective overshadows environmental and safety
regulatory goals. 17 Even after passage of the Energy Reorganization Act in 1974,
the Supreme Court recognized Congress' continuing directive to advance pri-
vate commercial development of nuclear power:
There is little doubt that a primary purpose of the Atomic Energy Act
was, and continues to be, the promotion of nuclear power. The Act it-
self states that it is a program "to encourage widespread participation
in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful pur-
poses to the maximum extent consistent with the common defense and
security and with the health and safety of the public." The House and
Senate Reports confirmed that it was "a major policy goal of the United
States" that the involvement of private industry would "speed the fur-
ther development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy."'1
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2012).
115. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2011 (2012)).
116. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 58Ol (shifting authority over nu-
clear power promotion to the Energy Research and Development Administra-
tion). In 1977, ERDA was combined with another agency to form the Department
of Energy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7151(a)-(b), 7293 (2012); see also Alice Buck, A History
of the Energy Research and Development Administration, DEP'T OF ENERGY 15
(1982), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/ ERDA%2oHistory.pdf.
117. See, e.g., Diane Carter Maleson, The Historical Roots of the Legal System's Response
to Nuclear Power, 55 S. CALIF. L. REV. 597 (1982).
118. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 221 (1983) (internal citations omitted). The Court found further support in
subsequent Congressional enactments of the Price-Anderson Act which limited
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Although the reasons have changed, the federal government has enthusias-
tically supported the development of private nuclear power since the beginning
of the private commercial program. 19 In the 195os, the desire to maintain U.S.
leadership and demonstrate the peaceful benefits of the technology "infused the
atomic power program with a sense of urgency." ' Although the public initially
strongly favored nuclear power, by the 196os, public attitudes had shifted, sub-
jecting nuclear power to widespread protests.'2 ' Meanwhile, regulators were
tasked with developing safety standards for new reactors while the first plants
were being designed, without the benefit of operating experience.' 2 At the same
time that the AEC and NRC have faced huge regulatory tasks with conflicting
pressures, Congress and the President have often left them with limited staff re-
sources."2 These limitations influenced the regulatory approach, including the
reluctance to devote substantial resources to NEPA analysis.'2 4
B. Judicial Deference: Vermont Yankee and Baltimore Gas
As discussed above, the Supreme Court's Vermont Yankee opinion strongly
endorsed the expertise model of agency decision-making and held that judicial
deference extended to the agency's choice of procedures. 2 5 In addition to its in-
fluence on administrative law generally, the opinion also significantly shaped
the relationship between courts and the NRC. Because it resolved the case by
rejecting the Circuit's purported procedural requirements, the Court avoided
the substantive merits, leaving these issues to be decided on remand."6 Substan-
tively, this decision concerned one of the most difficult challenges for nuclear
regulators: how to manage highly radioactive waste produced by nuclear reac-
tors.' 7 Based on proposed solutions to the nuclear waste problem, the NRC had
concluded that the incremental effect of additional licensing would not be sig-
private liability for nuclear accidents "in order to protect the public and to en-
courage the development of the atomic energy industry." Id. (internal quotations
and citation omitted).
119. See GEORGE T. MAZUZAN & J. SAMUEL WALKER, CONTROLLING THE ATOM 91 (1985).
120. Walker & Wellock, supra note 12, at 3.
121. See J. SAMUEL WALKER, CONTAINING THE ATOM 387-88, 405-14 (1992).
122. MAZUZAN & WALKER, supra note 119, at 119.
123. See id. at 423.
124. Id. at 370.
125. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978).
126. Id. at 549.
127. See Charles de Sailan, Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States and
Europe: A Persistent Environmental Problem, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 461, 472
(2011).
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nificant and hence it need not reopen licensing conducted before the agency
began considering waste storage impacts.' s
After remand, the case returned to the Supreme Court in Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.1 29 This decision reviewed
the NRC's use of rulemaking to pre-determine the nuclear fuel cycle's environ-
mental costs and requirement that licensing boards employ these conclusions in
NEPA analyses for individual proceedings. The Rule set forth these findings in a
table using a "zero-release" assumption, reflecting a conclusion that high-level
waste stored in a common offsite repository would cause no significant envi-
ronmental impacts.'30 Relying on Vermont Yankee, the Court stated: "NEPA
does not require agencies to adopt any particular internal decisionmaking
structure. Here, the agency has chosen to evaluate generically the environmen-
tal impact of the fuel cycle and inform individual licensing boards, through the
Table S-3 rule, of its evaluation." 3'
The Court concluded that this generic method satisfied the "hard look" re-
quired by NEPA, accepting the NRC's view that "[t]he environmental effects of
much of the fuel cycle are not plant specific [because] any plant ... will create
additional wastes that must be stored in a common long-term repository." 2
Moreover, it noted the efficiency and consistency provided by generic rulemak-
ing, which avoids "needless repetition of the litigation in individual proceed-
ings." '133 Given this endorsement, it is not surprising that the NRC's use of ge-
neric rulemaking expanded significantly after this case, as described further
below. Rejecting the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the zero-release assump-
tion failed to reflect uncertainties, Justice O'Connor wrote: "[A] reviewing
court must remember that the Commission is making predictions, within its ar-
ea of special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examining this kind of sci-
entific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court
must generally be at its most deferential.'13 4
Yet while the court's deferential stance stemmed from the agency's pur-
ported application of scientific expertise to predict matters "at the frontiers of
science," the critical substantive determinations actually had little to do with
nuclear science or engineering. Contrary to Vermont Yankee's reasons for defer-
ring to agency procedural decisions, it also had nothing to do with the NRC's
understanding of the specific industry in its domain. As the Court of Appeals
explained, the most important areas of uncertainty were not technical, but ra-
ther political and institutional: whether the federal government could even lo-
128. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S at 538.
129. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
130. Id. at 101-03.
131. Id. at ioo-oi.
132. Id. at lOl.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 103 (emphases added).
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cate a site for the permanent repository and garner agreement from affected
state, local, and tribal governments.135 Moreover, the primary responsibility for
developing a repository resided in another agency, the Department of Energy,
and success would require cooperation between numerous agencies at all levels
of government. Thus, the "scientific determination" to which the Supreme
Court deferred consisted predominantly of the NRC's prediction that another
agency would garner sufficient resources and political will to successfully site
and construct the underground repository. The projected answer that the NRC
gave to this political question depended upon factors far beyond the particular
competence of nuclear engineers. By uncritically collapsing all decision factors
into matters of scientific expertise, the Court gave unquestioning "super-
deference" to the NRC.'36
Whatever factors explain judicial deference to the NRC's decision-
making,'37 review of both formal doctrine and case outcomes demonstrates that
135. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'm, 685 F.2d 459,
48o-81 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[T] he record indicates that serious concerns were raised
over the likelihood of developing the human institutions or political consensus
necessary to establish and maintain the hypothesized facilities. The IRG Report
noted, in fact, 'that the resolution of institutional issues may well be more difficult
than finding solutions to remaining technical problems.' ... In its Statement of
Consideration for the final Rule, 'the Commission note[d] and agree[d] ... that
areas of uncertainty remain regarding both the likelihood of finding a site and the
probability that it will perform as expected.' ... Moreover, revealing even more of
the uncertain nature of its judgment, the Commission concluded that the evi-
dence, although 'tentative' and general in nature, 'favors the view that suitable
sites can be found."').
136. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, The Science Obsession, and Judicial
Review of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REv. 733, 734 (2o11) (describing the princi-
ple that "courts ought to be at their 'most deferential' when reviewing an agency's
scientific determinations" as the "super deference" approach). Indeed, prelimi-
nary empirical work suggests that that the Court gives greater deference to agen-
cies that work in highly technical areas, regardless of the complexity of the specific
policy. See Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Chevron" as a Canon, Not
a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference
Cases, 11o COLOMB. L. REV. 1727, 1782-83 (2010) ("[T]he complexity of the agency
policy decision at issue was not correlated with application of deference doctrine.
This was a surprising finding, because agency expertise has since the New Deal
been the most commonly expressed rationale for judicial deference....
[Hlowever, the justices did not grant agencies greater deference when evaluating
'technical' agency policies.... [W]e also found that the Justices were less apt to
overturn policies issued by agencies in highly and modestly technical areas.").
137. Scholars have developed numerous competing theories to explain judicial choice
of deference regimes-from individual ideological convictions, to rational choic-
es, to sincere concern with the legal rules, among other things. See, e.g., Raso &
Eskridge, supra note 136, at 1743-52.
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the NRC receives an extreme degree of judicial deference. The Supreme Court
has stated that the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) gave the agency "broad regulatory
authority over the development of nuclear power.""38 Lower courts have taken
the NRC's special deference treatment seriously. As the D.C. Circuit stated: "we
have.., long noted the increased deference due NRC procedural rules because
of the 'unique degree "to which broad responsibility is reposed in the [Commis-
sion], free of close prescription in its charter as to how it shall proceed in
achieving the statutory objectives." 139 This deferential legal stance is reflected in
a very high win rate for the agency.1 4
As one scholar explained, Congress's heavy reliance on scientists to com-
prehend nuclear technology caused it to make an "unprecedented delegation of
power to an agency run by appointed officials and funded by persons who did
not understand its inner workings."1 4 Despite the value of judicial review in
such circumstances, "any attempt on the part of municipal and state officials,
trial judges, scientists, or others, to question the wisdom and authority of this
extraordinary legislative creation has been met with an almost impenetrable
wall of Supreme Court deference to agency expertise."' 42 Given this context, the
NRC has had free reign to develop rules and procedures for licensing commer-
cial nuclear power plants.
C. Inside the NRC: Task Force Review and Post-Fukushima Actions
After Fukushima, the NRC's former Chairman, Gregory Jackzo, created the
Task Force to determine whether lessons learned from the accident demon-
strated the need to revise the NRC's policy direction, regulatory structure, or
specific technical and operational requirements.' 43 The NRC's Operations Di-
rector assembled a group of high-level managers from several departments
within the agency to staff the Task Force. Although it concluded that continued
operation of U.S. reactors created no imminent danger because similar trigger-
ing events were unlikely to occur in the United States, the group identified sig-
nificant gaps in the NRC's regulatory structure and in oversight of specific haz-
138. Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 526.
139. Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 920 F.2d 50, 54
(D.C. Cir. 199o) (quoting BPI v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 502 F.2d 424, 428 n.3
(D.C. Cir. 1974)); see also Cities of Statesville v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 441 F.2d
962, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc) (noting that the NRC "should be accorded
broad discretion in establishing and applying rules for.., public participation").
140. See e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Bauer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretation from Chevron to
Hamdan, 90 GEO. L.J. 1O83, 1145, 1204 (2013) (showing a ninety-three percent win
rate in energy cases, with NRC cases predominantly populating the sample).
141. Maleson, supra note 117, at 607.
142. Id.
143. NTTF REPORT, supra note i, at vii.
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ards. The Task Force recommended changes to both the content and manner of
NRC regulations, urging the agency to replace its "patchwork"'" approach with
"a logical, coherent, and systematic regulatory framework."'14 Preparing for
complex accidents like Fukushima required improving regulations on several
critical issues, including reactor accidents, station-blackout, and seismic haz-
ards.'46 The Task Force also identified multiple instances in which safety stand-
ards had been inconsistently applied,'147 including flooding and earthquake
standards adopted in 1996 and 1997 that existing reactors were not required to
meet. 4 ' Different standards were applied to plants depending not upon their
specific vulnerabilities to natural hazards but rather upon the historical accident
of their construction and licensing dates.'
49
Regarding accident risk, the Task Force criticized the NRC's over-reliance
on postulated "design-basis" accident models to the neglect of updated analysis
for more complex scenarios. In order to modify these (often decades old)
standards as new information arose, the Commission had relied on "a patch-
work of beyond-design-basis requirements" found in memoranda, guidance
documents, policy statements, and voluntary initiatives to maintain plant safe-
ty. 5' The Task Force recommended that these informal rules be formalized in
rulemaking 5' and advised that voluntary industry initiatives "should not serve
as a substitute for regulatory requirements but as a mechanism for facilitating
and standardizing implementation of such requirements."'52 Formally estab-
lished strategies to address these complex accidents would better comport with
NRC's guiding "defense-in-depth" philosophy which emphasizes redundant
layers of protection.'53 The Task Force also recommended that the NRC adopt
regulations mandating preparation for beyond-design-basis events at all
plants. '54
144. Id.
145. Id. at 15.
146. Id. at ix.
147. Id. at vii ("The result is a patchwork of regulatory requirements and other safety
initiatives, all important, but not all given equivalent consideration and treatment
by licensees or during NRC technical review and inspection." (emphasis added)).
148. Id. at 26, 29.
149. Id. at 28 ("[T]he licensing bases, design, and level of protection from natural phe-
nomena differ among the existing operating reactors in the United States, de-
pending on when the plant was constructed and when the plant was licensed for
operation.").
150. Id. at 18.
151. Id. at 20-21.
152. Id. at viii.
153. Id. at 20.
154. Id. at viii.
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In light of the Task Force's findings and other analyses, the Commission
identified priority "Tier One" actions "to be taken without delay."'55 Among
other things, the NRC ordered all licensees to inspect systems, structures, and
components that protect against seismic hazards; report degraded or noncon-
forming conditions; and reevaluate the adequacy of power supplies and emer-
gency preparedness staffing to address accidents involving multiple reactors." 6
Many plant inspections and hazard reevaluations showed a need for updated
equipment.'57
The agency also initiated rulemaking to raise standards for emergency pre-
paredness, severe accident mitigation, spent fuel pool instrumentation, reactor
containment vessels,and backup power supplies in case of station blackout.' 8
The Commission directed staff to develop a probabilistic risk assessment meth-
odology "to evaluate potential enhancements to plants' capability to prevent or
mitigate seismically induced fires and floods."5 9 Numerous other Tier 2 and 3
activities remain to be implemented, including the Task Force's primary rec-
ommendation that the NRC replace its "patchwork" of safety standards with a
"logical and consistent regulatory framework." 6 '
As of July 2014, the NRC had issued orders requiring new procedures for
maintaining safety during prolonged loss of electrical power, improved con-
tainment venting systems,'6' and requirements for instrumentation that could
provide a "reliable indication of water level in ... spent fuel storage pools."'62
The NRC also required all licensees to reevaluate hazards from earthquakes,
flooding, and station blackout.'6 3 Reevaluation of seismic hazards after Fuku-
shima revealed that numerous plants face potential earthquakes exceeding their
design bases. Updated analysis showed that the data used to set initial licensing
criteria significantly understated potential ground motion. 6 4 For these plants,
155. R.W. Borchardt, Prioritization of Recommended Actions To Be Taken in Response to
Fukushima Lessons Learned, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N (2011),
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/ docs/ML11z6/ML11269A20 4 .pdf.




16o. NTTF REPORT, supra note 1, at 15, 69.
161. This provision aimed to provide a reliable heat and containment venting system
for boiling water reactors Mark I or Mark II, which, like the reactors at the Fuku-
shima-Dai-ichi plant were General Electric designs with the same vulnerabilities.
162. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, Order EA 12-051, ORDER MODIFYING LICENSES
WITH REGARD TO RELIABLE SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION 33 (2012).
163. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON SEISMIC,
FLOODING, AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (2012).
164. See Memorandum from Scott C. Flanders, Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, to David
Skeen, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regarding Support Docu-
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the NRC required licensees to reassess their equipment needs to ensure that
plants could be safely shutdown in the case of larger earthquakes, particularly
when loss of electrical power complicated responses.'65
It must be acknowledged that development of these new protections re-
quired tremendous staff effort and reflects a positive aspect of the NRC's cul-
ture: a willingness to seek criticism to benefit regulatory learning. Nonetheless,
it should not take a major accident to recognize unnecessary hazards. These
concerns that are finally being addressed did not come out of the blue. Rather,
as described below, multiple parties-including states, localities, nonprofits, in-
ternal critics, and other federal agencies-have repeatedly raised the same issues
for many years. However, the NRC's choice of regulatory tools blocked consid-
eration of this input. As discussed in Part Ill, the agency's hearing procedures
and generic NEPA rules prevented adequate evaluation of individualized plant
circumstances and potential adverse interactions between various safety sys-
tems. Commission-imposed restrictions on staff's ability to revise license re-
quirements compounded these problems. In combination, these factors ren-
dered agency experts partially illiterate. Unfortunately, the NRC's recent NEPA
and Waste Confidence rulemakings described in Part IV suggest that the agency
has not recognized these effects and thus has overlooked important lessons
from Fukishima.
III. AGENCY ILLITERACY: LICENSING PROCEDURES AND NEPA REGULATIONS
The following describes NRC regulations that have undermined regulatory
oversight of commercial reactors. After providing background on the licensing
process, Section A explains how the agency's backfitting restriction imposed os-
sification from within. It then discusses participation limits that blocked the
flow of information to policymakers in licensing decisions. Evolving regulations
increasingly constrained public participation by raising specificity requirements
for intervenors' claims, using unreviewable license exemptions instead of li-
cense amendments, and limiting the scope of relicensing proceedings. Section B
describes how the agency's overuse of generic factual determinations precluded
licensing boards from considering plant-specific risks. It shows how this ap-
proach prevented the public and internal dissenters from effectively raising im-
portant safety and environmental concerns, leaving the NRC illiterate as to the
very hazards Fukushima highlighted.
Section C discusses the NRC's adoption of NEPA regulations for relicens-
ing that deployed generic findings to significantly limit environmental analysis,
thereby contributing to the NRC's failure to consider updated analysis and in-
vestigate systemic interactions. The agency's particularly illogical finding that
the impact of severe accidents could be generically determined to be "small" for
ment for Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-
Evaluations for Operating Reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (May
21, 2014).
165. Id. at 2.
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all of the nation's one hundred reactors precluded consideration of plant loca-
tion and unique hazards in relicensing proceedings. Finally, Section D describes
the agency's use of categorical exclusions to further limit NEPA analysis. Taken
together these agency rules contributed to the regulatory failures identified after
Fukushima.
A. Licensing, Backfitting, and Public Participation Limits
1. Licensing Overview and Ossification from Within
One of the NRC's key functions is to oversee commercial power reactor li-
censing. The NRC grants initial licenses for a period of forty years,'66 with li-
cense renewals available for twenty-year periods.'6 7 The vast majority of the
roughly one hundred operating nuclear reactors in the United States were ini-
tially licensed during the 196os and 1970s. Most plants either already have or
soon will need a renewed license to continue operations.16' As of February 2013,
the NRC had already renewed seventy-three licenses. 169 The Atomic Energy Act
and NRC regulations subject licensing decisions to review by independent li-
censing boards. Initial adjudication of commercial reactor licenses occurs be-
fore the Atomic Safety Licensing Board (Licensing Board), 17° with automatic
appeals to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (Appeal Board), also
composed of three members. The five-member Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion may review these decisions at its discretion and makes ultimate determina-
/tions as to whether the licensing "will be in accord with the common defense
and security and will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the
public."' 71
Federal law charges the NRC with ensuring adequate protection of the pub-
lic's health and safety,'72 although this vague standard is not defined in the
166. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(c) (2012) (specifying that the initial licensing period is limited to
forty years).
167. 10 C.F.R. § 5 4 .31(b).
168. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NUCLEAR REACTOR LICENSE RENEWAL 13-493, at 5.
169. Id.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) (authorizing the Commission to establish licensing boards
with three members, "one of whom shall be qualified in the conduct of adminis-
trative proceedings and two of whom shall have such technical or other qualifica-
tions as the Commission deems appropriate to the issues to be decided").
171. 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2012). The Courts of Appeals have exclusive initial jurisdic-
tion to review final licensing orders. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(4) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §
2239(b) (2012).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 2232 (2012) (stating that the Commission must ensure that "the utili-
zation or production of special nuclear material will... provide adequate protec-
tion to the health and safety of the public").
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Atomic Energy Act or NRC regulations. The NRC relies heavily on licensees to
ensure that their operations meet the adequate protection standard and to pro-
vide the agency with information about the effectiveness of plant components
and safety features. '73 License applicants must provide "reasonable assurance"
that the reactor design and operation will adequately protect public health and
welfare, but the NRC has refused to precisely define this latter term, contending
that "'[r]easonable assurance' is not susceptible to formalistic quantification or
mechanistic application. Rather, whether the reasonable assurance standard is
met is based upon sound technical judgment applied on a case-by-case basis.' 74
The upshot is that these vague standards leave room for the NRC to make poli-
cy determinations that balance competing values, implicating the ongoing de-
bate in administrative law over the legitimacy, efficacy, and role of experts in
discretionary agency judgments.
Operating license applications must include a Safety Analysis Report de-
scribing design features and procedures that demonstrate adequate protection,
as well as an Environmental Report providing preliminary NEPA analysis. The
NRC staff reviews these submissions and produces a publicly available Safety
Evaluation Report and draft NEPA documents for review and comment. The
Safety Analysis Report, among other things, discusses postulated hypothetical
accidents and describes features that-will be incorporated into the design and
operation to prevent and mitigate these accidents. The NRC characterizes this
set of postulated accidents as "design-basis accidents." 175 The plant must be de-
signed with technical specifications to ensure that it can withstand these specific
accident sequences. Design-basis accidents have been described as a "collection
of events each of which is considered to have some likelihood of occurrence
during the lifetime of the plant." 76 They provide a set of "what if' occurrences
against which the plant design can be assessed to determine if it adequately pro-
173. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, STAFF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE DIGEST Sec. 3.8.1
(Mar. 2011) ("A licensee of a nuclear power plant has a great responsibility to the
public, one that is increased by the Commission's heavy dependence on the licen-
see for accurate and timely information about the facility and its operation. The
NRC is dependent upon all of its licensees for accurate and timely information.
The licensee must have a detailed knowledge of the quality of installed plant
equipment." (internal citations omitted)).
174. AmerGen Energy Co., LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), 66 NRC
327, 340 (2007), affd, 69 NRC 235, 263 (2009) (rejecting the argument that reason-
able assurance should be quantified with ninety-five confidence).
175. See NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, NUREG-1437, Generic Environmental Im-
pact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Grand Gulf SEIS S-GElS, 5-
i (June 2013); lo C.F.R. § 50 (regarding licensing); io C.F.R. § loo (regarding reac-
tor site clearance) [hereinafter NUREG-14371.
176. In re United States Dep't of Energy Project Mgmt. Corp. Tenn. Valley Auth.
(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), 19 N.R.C. 288, 306 (1984).
33 : 323 2015
DECISIONS, DISASTERS, AND DEFERENCE
tects the public from excessive radiation.' 77 While design-basis accidents receive
methodological scrutiny, accident sequences deemed to be too improbable and
hence "beyond" the design-basis category have received only haphazard review.
Fukushima showed many of these more complicated sequences to be possible,
such as failures at multiple reactors on the same site and lengthy station black-
out. As discussed in the next section, the Task Force specifically critiqued the
NRC's failure to systematically address accident sequences deemed beyond the
design-basis.
A major constraint on staff's ability to update hazard protections stems
from the Commission's rulemaking on "backfitting."'' 8 The backfitting rule re-
quires staff to formally analyze the costs and benefits of any new or revised safe-
ty standard before imposing it upon existing licensees. 79 Analysis must demon-
strate that the new or revised requirement will provide "a substantial increase in
protection to the public health and safety or the common defense and security
whose costs are justified in light of the increased protection.""'k Licensees can
appeal staff determinations regarding what actions constitute a backfit as well as
the adequacy of the cost-benefit analysis.'1
8
The initial rulemaking imposing cost-benefit analysis requirements for
backfitting was highly controversial, finalized over the dissent of two of the five
NRC Commissioners. Is2 Indeed, Commissioner Asselstine described the rule as
an "unprecedented" self-imposed limitation on the administrative discretion to
update safety requirements, remarking: "I can think of no other instance in
which a regulatory agency has been so eager to stymie its own ability to carry
out its responsibilities."'' s Technical staff, including the Commission's chief
177. Id.
178. See lo C.F.R. § 50.109 ("Backfitting is defined as the modification of or addition to
systems, structures, components, or design of a facility; or the design approval or
manufacturing license for a facility; or the procedures or organization required to
design, construct or operate a facility; any of which may result from a new or
amended provision in the Commission's regulations or the imposition of a regu-
latory staff position interpreting the Commission's regulations that is either new
or different from a previously applicable staff position.").
179. Id.
18o. See iO Id.. The regulation also allows a new standard to be applied to existing li-
censees if the standard is "necessary to ensure that the facility provides adequate
protection." Id. However, staff invocation of this provision requires the redefini-
tion of statutory mandates. Id.
181. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH,
COMMISSION DIRECTIVE HANDBOOK 8.4, MANAGEMENT OF FACILITY-SPECIFIC
BACKFITTING AND INFORMATION COLLECTION, 12-16 (Oct. 9, 2013).
182. See NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, Revision of Backfitting Process for Power Re-
actors, 50 Fed. Reg. 38,097-02, 38, 104 (noting disapproval by Commissioners As-
selstine and Bernthal).
183. Id. at 38,1o6 (views of Commissioner Asselstine).
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safety officer, shared Asselstine's concerns, opposing the rule.'8 4 Because the
backfitting rule hindered identification and correction of safety problems at nu-
clear power plants, the chief safety officer believed it would perpetuate the
"piecemeal, reactive approach to safety which has been responsible for many of
the failures of the past."'8
Because the rule increases the legally-mandated analytical burden beyond
APA requirements, it can be viewed as ossification from within. The backfitting
regulations imposed "a very high standard or threshold the Commission must
meet before it can institute safety improvements."'86 The rule created a "law-
yer's paradise"'8 7 that Commissioner Bernthal believed to "contain[] the seeds
for rulemaking chaos," increasing litigation, unpredictability, and lengthening
an already "tortured" rulemaking process.'
Although the rule could be characterized as "procedural," the backfit regu-
lation reflects a substantive policy choice by the NRC to reduce regulatory bur-
dens upon licensees and limit the discretion of future NRC policymakers to
strike a different balance between economics and safety. Because the rule does
not apply to new licensees or voluntarily licensee actions, it promotes the over-
reliance on voluntary initiatives and a lack of standardization both of which
were identified by the Task Force.
2. Public Participation Limits
In general, "interested parties" can request a hearing on licensing decisions
and regulatory changes that affect licensing.'8 9 Under the NRC's practice proce-
dures, intervenors must first establish that they have affected interests, a re-





188. Id. at 38,110 (views of Commissioner Bernthal).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) (2012) ("In any proceeding under this chapter, for the
granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license or construction per-
mit.., and in any proceeding for the issuance or modification of rules and regu-
lations dealing with the activities of licensees ... the Commission shall grant a
hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the pro-
ceeding, and shall admit any such person as a party to such proceeding.").
190. See lo C.F.R. § 2.714; In re Duke Energy Corporation (Catawba Nuclear Station),
59 N.R.C. 129 (2004) ("[LIicensing boards look to judicial concepts of standing for
guidance in determining whether a petitioner has established the necessary inter-
est under io C.F.R. § 2.7 14 (d)(1). To qualify for standing under these concepts, a
petitioner must allege (i) a concrete and particularized injury that is (2) fairly
traceable to the challenged action and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable de-
cision, criteria commonly referred to, respectively, as 'injury in fact,' causality,
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ted, and for the agency to even consider the issues, interested parties must also
submit at least one narrow contention referring to specific documents or ex-
perts that support facts sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact or
law.'9' In 1989, the agency amended its practice rules, significantly heightening
specificity requirements. Under the new rules, in order to file timely conten-
tions, intervenors must make their submissions long before staff completes its
review of the applicant's submissions and publishes the draft EIS. These changes
were upheld by the D.C. Circuit in 199o.192
During that same period, the NRC adopted new licensing procedures that
further limited public participation. Until 1989, operators had to undergo a
two-step initial licensing process, obtaining a construction and then an operat-
ing license, both subject to licensing board review and potential challenge. To
encourage investment in nuclear power, new regulations streamlined the pro-
cess by allowing operators to obtain a combined construction and operating li-
cense in one step. 193 In addition, the NRC created a rulemaking process to ap-
prove standard reactor designs, thus improving prospects for uniform plant
designs that would be easier to regulate while also precluding potential plant
design challenges during licensing hearings. 194
Procedures allowing existing licensees to seek revisions also limit public
participation. The NRC processes numerous license amendments, which, like
other licensing actions, are also generally subject to a hearing upon the request
of an interested party; however, the agency may forgo the potential hearing if it
and redressability. The injury may be either actual or threatened, but must lie ar-
guably within the 'zone of interests' protected by the statutes governing the pro-
ceeding.").
191. lo C.F.R. § 2.714(b); see also Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances, Opinions
and Decisions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission with Selected Orders January 1-
June 30, 20oo at 29, pbadupws.nrc.gov.docs/MLo2o5/MLoo56o61o.pdf ("In order
for a petition for leave to intervene to be granted, the petitioner must proffer at
least one contention conforming to the requirements of lo C.F.R. §§ 2.714(b) and
(d). In particular, a contention must include (1) a brief explanation of the bases of
the contention; (2) a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion on
which the petitioner intends to rely, including references to specific sources and
documents; and (3) sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists
with the applicant (or licensee) on a material issue of law or fact.").
192. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 920 F.2d 50
(D.C. Cir. 199o).
193. See io C.F.R. § 52 Subpart C (effective Sept. 27, 2007); see also 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372,
15,379 (Apr. 18, 1989) (Arguing that the AEA does not require a two-step process
and that the NRC is authorized to combine construction and operating permits).
194. See Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined Licens-
es for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372, 15,382-83 (codified at 52
C.F.R. subpart B) (describing the design certification process).
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finds that the amendment involves no significant hazards. '95 In practice, these
determinations prove difficult to challenge because they shift the burden on the
challenger to identify and demonstrate the significant hazard.
The NRC has increasingly used exemptions rather than amendments, an
approach that allows ad hoc changes to licensing requirements without public
participation or judicial review. In contrast to license amendments, courts have
found exemptions from license requirements to be unreviewable while also de-
ferring to agency categorization of actions as exemptions.' 96 In 2009, the Second
Circuit held in Brodsky v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission'97 that the NRC could
characterize its order allowing an operator to forgo certain fire safety regula-
tions as an "exemption" rather than as a license amendment, thus placing it
outside the court's jurisdiction. Although the order could have been character-
ized as a license amendment, the court found that the NRC reasonably applied
its regulations by treating the issue as an exemption.'9 s One year after Brodsky,
the NRC expanded its list of NEPA categorical exclusions to include exemptions
from license requirements,'99 thus blocking the public from challenging these
changes to licensing requirements on either substantive or NEPA grounds.
3. Narrow Scope of Relicensing Review
Under NRC rules adopted in the early 199os, staff performs a much more
limited review of safety and technical issues in relicensing proceedings than was
required for initial licensing.2"' Applicants are only required to submit technical
data on impacts from aging of plant components-such as metal fatigue, corro-
sion, and embrittlement. Technical review focuses on safe management of these
"aging related" issues.2"' The NRC limits license renewal proceedings to consid-
eration of issues concerning (i) age-related degradation unique to license re-
newal and (2) compliance with NEPA requirements."2 2 The NRC has read the
195. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (2)(A) (2012) ("The Commission may issue and make immedi-
ately effective any amendment to an operating license or any amendment to a
combined construction and operating license, upon a determination by the
Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration,
notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a hearing
from any person. Such amendment may be issued and made immediately effective
[before] completion of any required hearing.").
196. Brodsky v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 578 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2009).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 18o-83.
199. See 75 Fed. Reg. 20,248 (Apr. 19, 2010) (amending lo C.F.R. § 51.22).
200. See Walker & Wellock, supra note 12, at 69.
201. See io C.F.R. pt. 54.
202. See io C.F.R. § 54.29(a), (b). The NRC will conduct a hearing on an application to
renew a nuclear power reactor operating license. lo C.F.R. § 54.27 However, a
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first limitation to also constrain the second. Based on the narrow scope of reli-
censing hearings, the NRC has limited NEPA analysis to environmental impacts
solely from an additional twenty years of operation or aging of plant compo-
nents." 3 Thus, the NRC has refused to analyze emergency planning and severe
accident risk during NEPA analysis of relicensing on the rationale that the addi-
tional twenty years of operation do not directly create new environmental im-
pacts.20 4 However, this leaves the agency reliant on decades-old data (and po-
tentially outdated design standards) for many hazards and further forgoes
NEPA's opportunity to identify systemic risks by combining analysis of multi-
ple issues in one proceeding.
The NRC's rationale for excluding broader technical and environmental
analysis during relicensing goes like this: the initial licensing process (nearly for-
ty years earlier) and ongoing oversight are sufficient to address all important
reactor safety and environmental issues. Hence there is no need for analysis and
public comment during the relicensing process, except on a very limited range
of issues. The agency thus excludes other considerations, stating "ongoing regu-
latory processes are adequate to ensure that all currently operating reactors are
operated safely within their licensing bases now and will continue to be in the
future" and that "the manner in which these reactors are currently maintained
will be similarly maintained beyond the original forty-year operating period."20 5
However, the Task Force Report uncovered a regulatory culture that under-
mined safety by failing to consistently apply standards, refusing to require exist-
ing reactors to meet updated requirements, and excessively relying on voluntary
compliance measures that lacked oversight. This variation belies the agency's
justification for limiting the scope of NEPA analysis of relicensing based on
broad claims that "ongoing procedures" keep licensees' designs up-to-date.
Staff responses to Task Force recommendations further undermine this
claim. In a document produced by the working group charged with implement-
ing the Task Force's recommendations, staff rejected the notion that evolving
design-basis should be applied to existing plants, proposing a "forward fit" ra-
ther than a "retrospective" approach: "The staff believes that a forward-fit is the
more effective approach especially given that, under the staffs proposed ap-
proach, the processes for identifying and making decisions on the regulatory
formal "on-the-record" hearing under the APA is not required for reactor license
renewal proceedings. See Bait. Gas & Electric Co., 48 NRC 325, 342 (1998).
203. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 168, at 5; NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMM'N, STAFF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE DIGEST 6.11 (2011).
204. Id. (citing io C.F.R. §§ 54.29(c), 2.335 (formerly § 2.7 5 8(b)(2))). Although the
Commission has discretion to admit other issues based on intervenors' conten-
tions, the filing must "demonstrate that the issue raises a concern relating to ade-
quate protection which would occur only during the renewal period." Id.
205. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 168, at ii.
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requirements are unchanged. '2°6 This approach contradicts the Task Force's
recommendation that design-basis should evolve in response to new hazard in-
formation and be applied consistently to all plants. It also illustrates the hollow
nature of earlier claims regarding "ongoing oversight."
Litigation over Entergy's Indian Point reactor relicensing in New York il-
lustrates how relicensing procedures restrict the flow of relevant information.
The State of New York and others challenged the relicensing application for ig-
noring updated seismic risk analysis showing that the decades-old original li-
censing data upon which Entergy relied "significantly underestimated" earth-
quake risks." 7 The Board's explanation for rejecting this claim shows the NRC
to reverse NEPA responsibility to study and disclose impacts, instead shifting
the burden to challengers to demonstrate how the absent information would
alter the analysis:
NYS does not explain why "the most recent information" is sufficiently
different from the earlier data to make a material change in the conclu-
sions of the seismic SAMA [Severe Accident Mitigation Analysis].
Likewise NYS does not suggest feasible alternatives to address risks
posed by the new data, nor does it estimate the cost of the increased
margin of safety that would result from any severe accident mitigation
action. Similarly, while NYS questions whether the seismic SAMA
analysis is conservative, it does not demonstrate to what degree the as-
sumptions used by Entergy in the ER are not conservative0 8
After Fukushima, the NRC finally revisited seismic hazard analyses to de-
termine whether original licensing design standards sufficiently protected reac-
tors from earthquake damage. Reassessment placed Indian Point in a category
of reactors with the "highest re-evaluated hazard relative to the original plant
seismic design basis."20 9
B. Increasing Reliance on Generic Rules: The 198os
The NRC has increasingly used generic rules to limit the scope of analysis
in individual license adjudications. Through generic rulemaking, the agency
206. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, STAFF WORKING GROUP EVALUATION OF
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE DISPOSITION OF RECOMMENDATION I OF THE FUKUSHIMA
NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE REPORT 8 (May 14, 2013).
207. In re Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 2 & 3), 68 N.R.C. 43,
45.
208. Id.
209. See NUCLEAR REGULATOR COMM'N, SCREENING AND PRIORITIZATION RESULTS
REGARDING INFORMATION PURSUANT TO TILTE 10 OF THE CODE OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS 50.54(F) REGARDING SEISMIC HAZARD RE-EVALUATIONS FOR
RECOMMENDATION 2.1 OF THE NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE REVIEW OF INSIGHTS FROM
THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI 5, enc. 2 (May 9, 2014); see also Matthew L. Wald, Agency
Urges Quake Study for Indian Point, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2014).
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makes general determinations that purportedly apply to all reactors, thus dis-
placing individualized analysis. These generic proceedings offer regulatory effi-
ciency but also run the risk of creating disconnects between critically related
pieces of information. Generic rules combine with other agency limits on public
participation to exacerbate potential decision-making errors. By constraining
evaluation of potentially interrelated and plant specific risks during NEPA re-
view for individual licensing adjudications, the agency misses the opportunity
to identify interconnections, learn from outsiders, and correct decision-making
biases.
Moreover, the seemingly scientific (and hence expertise-based) substantive
determination used for generic rules significantly affects procedures by under-
mining public participation. Generic issues are decided during rulemaking
many years before individual licenses come up for renewal. Public opposition to
plant operations will stem from site-specific events (such as license renewals
and amendments) or time-specific events (such as accidents, news stories, or
official reports). Even sophisticated challengers, such as state attorneys general,
are unlikely to have the resources to follow all NRC rulemakings, particularly if
they occur before a reactor has been sited in the state. For local opponents-
public, private, and nonprofit-these impediments are even greater. In con-
trast, the Nuclear Energy Institute and utilities with nuclear power plants have a
single-issue focus and usually far greater resources, resulting in an overrepre-
sentation of their views. By the time a state or locality discovers that a plant li-
cense change is pending or that a new plant is expected nearby, it will be too late
to challenge the regulation. Thus, although scholars often describe one of the
benefits of rulemaking over adjudication as enhanced public participation, in
the case of nuclear power plants just the opposite is true.
In addition to reducing participation opportunities and impeding good de-
cision-making, the inappropriate use of "generic" analysis for dissimilar issues
prevents identification and analysis of site-specific impacts during adjudication.
The following section discusses early developments in the use of generic analysis
of severe accidents, earthquakes and emergency planning, and station blackout.
1. Severe Accident Risk
The NRC identifies two broad categories of reactor accidents in licensing:
design-basis and severe accidents. As discussed above, preparation for postulat-
ed design-basis accidents forms a key component of licensing. In contrast, se-
vere accidents have received much less systematic treatment, prompting the Fu-
kushima Task Force to recommend much greater coherence in severe accident
oversight. Severe accidents include those that can lead to core melt, generally
from a complex series of technical and operational errors. At the beginning of
the domestic nuclear power program, the Atomic Energy Commission (the
NRC's predecessor) thought severe accidents were too unlikely to warrant con-
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sideration '° Thus, NEPA documents in this early period did not analyze im-
pacts from severe accidents, " and legal challenges to this policy failed.
12
Several events in the late 1970s-the development of new risk assessment
tools, studies showing greater accident probabilities, and the Three Mile Island
partial core melt-made it difficult to continue discounting severe accident
risk 13 The NRC responded by drafting a policy that, among other things, re-
quired analysis of severe accidents in NEPA documents. 1 4 The agency also ex-
panded emergency preparedness requirements"5 and began a program to devel-
op measures to mitigate the impact of severe accidents.21
6
In 1985, the NRC finalized the Policy Statement on Severe Reactor Acci-
dents Regarding Future Designs and Existing Plantsm (Policy Statement)27 for
accidents causing "substantial damage.., to the reactor core." '' s While recog-
nizing severe accident preparation as an appropriate subject for oversight, the
Policy Statement constrained subsequent decision-making in two ways. First, it
found that "existing plants pose no undue risk to public health or safety" and
consequently "require no further regulatory action to deal with severe accident
issues unless significant new safety information arises."1 9 Thus, operating reac-
tors would not be subject to new regulatory requirements being developed for
new reactors. Second, the Policy Statement largely confined severe accident
210. Throughout the 197os, the AEC based its NEPA analysis of accidents on an acci-
dent rating scale, ranging from i (trivial) to 9 (severe). Classes 1-8 addressed vari-
ous design-basis accidents, all subject to analysis (except the "trivial" class i cate-
gory). Class 9 included "more complex sequences of successive failures, such as a
partial reactor core melt accompanied by the production of large quantities of
steam and gas or the rupture of the containment vessel." Limerick Ecology Action
v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 869 F.2d 719, 725-26 (3d Cir. 1989).
211. Id. (citing Carolina Envtl. Study Grp. v. United States, 51o F.2d 796, 798-800 (D.C.
Cir. 1975)).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 725 (citing RISK ASSESSMENT REVIEW GROUP REPORT TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION, NUREG/CR-o400 vi-x, 4-5 (1978)); see also WALKER,
supra note 11, at 216-25.
214. See Limerick, 869 F.2d at 726 (citing Statement of Interim Policy, Nuclear Power
Plant Accident Considerations Under the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 45 Fed. Reg. 40,101 (1980) [hereinafter NEPA Interim Policy Statement]).
215. Id.
216. Potential mitigation measures included, for example, strengthening reactor core
containment systems to prevent the sudden release of radioactive materials.
217. Policy Statement on Severe Reactor Accidents Regarding Future Designs and Ex-
isting Plants, 50 Fed. Reg. 32138-O1 (1985).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 32,143-44.
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analysis to generic rulemaking (a decision likely bolstered by its success in Bal-
timore Gas two years earlier). This procedural choice precluded licensing boards
from considering unique plant-specific risks in safety analysis for individual li-
censing proceedings.
Based on the Policy Statement's generic conclusions, the NRC staff also re-
fused to analyze potential measures to mitigate environmental impacts from
severe accidents during NEPA review for licensing. This issue came to the Third
Circuit in Limerick Ecology Action v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n.2 ° In Limerick,
the court rejected the NRC's contention that it could omit analysis of Severe
Accident Mitigation Design Alternatives (SAMDAs) from NEPA review in indi-
vidual licensing proceedings by relying on a Policy Statement's generic conclu-
sion that impacts would be small. The decision turned in part on the regulatory
tool employed: unlike the table used to generically define spent fuel impacts at
issue in Baltimore Gas, the Policy Statement was not adopted through notice
and comment rulemaking but rather through an informal mechanism.2 '
The court also distinguished the case on the substantive merits of using a
generic approach. In Baltimore Gas, a generic approach had a better rationale
given that it presumed common storage in a single federal waste repository ra-
ther than storage at individual plants. 2 In contrast, the impact of SAMDAs on
the environment will differ with the particular plant's design, construction and
location. Relying on Baltimore Gas's definition of risk and the NRC's own
statement that the magnitude of impact from radiation release depended upon
the surrounding population's size,2 23 the court identified the large variation in
accident consequences among different plants:
[B]ecause risk equals the likelihood of an occurrence times the severity
of the consequences.., even assuming that all plants are of exactly
equal design and construction, which they obviously are not, the risk
will vary with the potential consequences. Because the potential conse-
quences will largely be the product of the location of the plant, the risk
will vary tremendously across all plants.2
The court doubted that generic analysis could adequately identify the like-
lihood of severe accidents, particularly given the NRC's recognition of greater
hazards at some plants and the Policy Statement's requirement for individual-
ized consideration at new plants.2 5 Thus, it held that decision-makers had not
taken the required "hard look" at potential design alternatives for mitigating
severe accidents. It further held that the SAMDAs could not be treated generi-
22o. Limerick, 869 F.2d 719.
221. Id. at 736-37.
222. Id. at 738.
223. See id. (citing 48 Fed. Reg. at 16,020).
224. Id. (citing Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 104-05).
225. Id. at 739 n.23.
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cally under NEPA and that preclusion of their consideration in individual pro-
ceedings was inappropriate."'
After Limerick, the NRC required applicants to analyze SAMDAs if they had
not previously done so, demonstrating that judicial review can affect decision-
making processes. Although use of generic rulemaking to pre-adjudicate NEPA
issues expanded significantly after Baltimore Gas, the NRC continued to specifi-
cally carve out SAMDAs for plant specific environmental impact assessment.
However, the NRC did not take to heart the analytical basis for the ruling: the
court's recognition that individual plant vulnerabilities differ. The Policy
Statement was later incorporated into a 1996 rulemaking that generically con-
cluded that both design-basis and severe accidents would have only "small" en-
vironmental impacts for all plants. 27
The generic approach to severe accidents was not without sharp critics
from within the NRC. The Policy Statement and later NEPA regulations con-
cluded that severe accident risk was both generic and small based on the "prob-
ability-weighted consequences of atmospheric releases, fallout onto open bodies
of water, release to groundwater, and society and economic impacts from severe
accidents."2s Yet, as articulated by both the Limerick court and the dissenting
commissioner in the 1985 Severe Accident Policy Statement, the use of median
risk to set a specific accident probability not only overlooks broad variation
among individual plants, but also mischaracterizes accident risk as correspond-
ing with a specific number rather than a range of values. Dissenting Commis-
sioner Asselstine criticized the Policy Statement for "focus[ing] on a median
number, ignoring the actual range of values and the uncertainties inherent in
using a median number for decision making."22 9 Indeed, on the most concern-
ing end of the range, the numbers would likely contravene most public notions
of reasonable assurances: "[T]he information before the Commission indicates
that there could be anywhere between a 20 percent chance and a o.1 percent
chance of an accident at a nuclear reactor in the next 15 years that would result
in lethal doses to about 1,ooo people."2'3
Commissioner Asselstine also criticized the Commission for claiming that
accident risk had been fully evaluated despite the absence of any substantiating
evidence.2 3' He noted that the claim to have studied an "extensive range of tech-
226. Id. at 739.
227. See NUREG-1437, supra note 175, at Revision 1, 2-15, tbl.2.1-1.
228. Id.
229. POLICY STATEMENT ON SEVERE REACTOR ACCIDENTS REGARDING FUTURE DESIGNS
AND EXISTING PLANTS, 5o Fed. Reg. 32,138, 32,147 (AUG. 8, 1985) (Comm'r As-
selstine, dissenting).
230. Id.
231. Id. ("The Commission claims in this policy statement to have examined an exten-
sive range of technical issues relating to severe accident risks in reaching its judg-
ment 'that existing plants do not pose an undue level of risk to the public.' The
Commission's policy statement does not, however, incorporate an explanation, or
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nical issues" was not supported by any description of these issues, methodology,
or decision criteria.2 32 While acknowledging that risk assessment methodologies
vary, he concluded that it was "impossible to discern the bases for the Commis-
sion's decision. '233
By carving off severe accidents from analysis of other issues, it also prevent-
ed the integration of information regarding various accident triggers into one
hearing. For example, the generic analysis did not assess the impact of severe
accidents caused by external phenomena such as extreme weather, earthquakes,
and flooding. Instead, the NRC presumed that analysis of accidents caused by
internal factors would be sufficient to characterize impacts of accidents caused
by external events. Thus, the environmental impacts for an externally caused
accident were assumed to be no worse than the damage expected from internal
events. Based on this presumption, the NRC precluded individual licensing
boards from analyzing accidents triggered by external off-site events, such as
earthquakes, fires, floods, outside actors, and severe weather or offsite accidents
that disrupt power supplies. 34
From 50,000 feet, the Commission's general claim-that it relied on tech-
nical analysis to conclude that severe accidents posed no undue public risk-
appears to be backed up by agency expertise. Yet if this claim relies on a hunch
rather than data, courts will not spot the difference unless they at least look to
see if the analysis exists. This does not require courts to reanalyze the data itself,
but does require them to check the agency's broad claims to see if the agency
actually used its expertise in reaching a policy conclusion.
2. Station Blackout
Segregation of interrelated issues can also be observed in the NRC's rule-
making for station blackouts. Because removal of decay heat from the reactor
core and containment vessel depends upon electrically-operated safety systems,
loss of offsite power can trigger a severe accident absent sufficient backup pow-
er.2 35 Indeed, power loss contributes more than seventy percent of overall risk
for that matter even a description, of the most significant issues that have been re-
solved and the manner in which they were resolved. Nor does it include a descrip-
tion of the methods of analyses used in resolving the issues or decision criteria
that were used for reaching the ultimate judgment. It is, therefore, impossible to
discern the bases for the Commission's decision .... The range of chances could
be larger than this if one considers all contributors to the core meltdown proba-
bility and all uncertainties .... Admittedly, there are many ways of going about es-
timating the range of risks. However, if there is validated quantitative information
on core meltdown risks that is better, it has not yet been demonstrated.").
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. NUREG-1437, supra note 175, at 5-2.
235. See 77 Fed. Reg. 16,175, 16,178 (2012) [hereinafter Station Blackout ANPR].
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for some plants.236 This danger was unaddressed until the 1975 Reactor Safety
Study demonstrated that potential AC power outages could be an important
contributor to accident risk.23 7 The Commission designated station blackout as
an "unresolved safety issue" in 198o, prompting staff to study the issue and ul-
timately propose a new rule.23
In 1988, the NRC finalized an Evaluation of Station Blackout Accidents at
Nuclear Power Plants239 in support of a new generic rule. After analyzing a da-
tabase compiling loss of offsite power events, the rule relied on average occur-
rence rates and blackout durations to characterize blackout risk: "Historically, a
loss of off-site power occurs about once per lo site-years. The typical duration
of these events is on the order of one-half hour."' 40 However, the analysis rec-
ognized that "at some power plants the frequency of offsite power loss has been
substantially greater than the average, and at other plants the duration of offsite
power outages has greatly exceeded the norm."4' The study identified multiple
site-specific factors that significantly affected both the likelihood and potential
duration of station blackouts at individual plants, including "design characteris-
tics, operational features, and the location of nuclear power plants within dif-
ferent grids and meteorological areas." 42
The final regulation required that nuclear power plants have the capability
to maintain core cooling and containment integrity for a certain duration, de-
pending upon several factors, some of them site-specific. 4 3 Critically, the NRC
concluded that operators need not consider potential power outages from fire,
flood, and seismic events in determining the risk of offsite power loss. 244 The
rule was limited in another important respect: the rule only required onsite
emergency power for "unit specific" outages and did not consider loss of AC
236. Id. ("Unavailability of power can have a significant adverse impact on a plant's
ability to achieve and maintain safe-shutdown conditions. In fact, risk analyses
performed for nuclear power plants indicate that the loss of all AC power can be a
significant contributor to the risk associated with plant operation, contributing
more than 70 percent of the overall risk at some plants.").
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Evaluation of Station Blackout Accidents at
Nuclear Power Plants: Technical Findings Related to Unresolved Safety Issue A-44,
Final Report, NUREG-1o32, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N (June 1988).
240. Id. at 3-1.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. One factor considered the station's existing capability in terms of the redundancy
and reliability of onsite emergency power. Two other factors assessed site-specific
risks: expected frequency and duration of loss of offsite power events. Station
Blackout ANPR, supra note 235, at 16,178.
244. Id.
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power to all reactor units at a given site. 45 By separating analysis of seismic,
flood, and fire events (which were addressed in other rulemakings in terms of
their direct effect on plants) from potential power losses, the NRC omitted
analysis of potentially devastating interactions, as evidenced by the Fukushima
disaster, in which seismic and flooding events caused a station blackout that
precipitated onsite fires and containment breach. Fukushima also illustrated the
potential for multiple reactor events to overwhelm underprepared staff.
The site-specific nature of these risks was not incorporated into NEPA
analysis, which treated issues affected by station blackouts generically. The ge-
neric approach to decision-making caused the agency to rely on average likeli-
hoods of blackouts to determine regulatory actions. However, the analysis
demonstrates that the plants are not sufficiently similar for averaging to accu-
rately capture the potential risks and necessary remedies. The agency's use of
averaging can mask the substantial risk at individual plants and subsume im-
portant differences between specific plants and locales. In addition, the NRC
specifically refused to coordinate consideration of external events (such as fires
and earthquakes) with the risk of station blackout. Consequently, the agency
overlooked the potential risk from loss of monitoring instruments over spent
fuel pools and other plant safety mechanisms.24 6
Station blackout rulemakings also demonstrate how issue segregation can
prevent information from being assembled. Segregation of issues limits the
agency's ability to see interconnections. The accident at Fukushima, however,
illustrated the utter inadequacy of such segregated analysis.
3. Earthquakes and Emergency Planning
The Commission's determination that licensing should proceed based on
centralized rules without the distraction of individualized, plant-specific analy-
sis can be seen in its displacement of individual licensing boards' initiative in
safety evaluations. In the licensing proceeding for the San Onofre plant, for ex-
ample, the licensing board raised emergency planning issues sua sponte, inquir-
ing whether emergency plans should account for how earthquake damage to
infrastructure might complicate accident management and evacuation.147 On its
own motion, the Commission took up the issue in September 1981, deciding
that "current regulations do not require consideration of the impacts on emer-
gency planning of earthquakes which cause or occur during an accidental radio-
logical release." 48 Rather, the issue should be considered generically, if at all,
and the licensing board should "not to pursue this issue in this proceeding."' 49
245. Id. at 16,179.
246. NTTF Report, supra note 1.
247. In re So. Cal. Edision Co. (San Onofre), 14 NRC 1091, 1091-92 (1981).
248. Id. at 1o91.
249. Id. at 1092.
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This 3-2 Commission decision drew rebuke from dissenting Commission-
ers who saw this decision as part of a broader pattern: "It appears the Commis-
sion will go to any length to avoid having a Licensing Board deal with a ques-
tion the Board itself has raised."'25 Commissioner Gilinsky argued:
The San Onofre Board asked.., whether the applicant and NRC staff
had considered the possibility that an earthquake which damages the
reactor might simultaneously disrupt evacuation routes and sever
offsite communication. It seems a reasonable question to ask about a
nuclear plant in an earthquake-prone area... . A common sense ap-
proach would let the Board examine and decide the issue in the partic-
ular circumstances of this case. This could be done simply and quickly
and the Commission would have a chance to review the result. Instead,
to take the matter outside the adjudicatory process, the Commission
has decided that the question ... should therefore be handled "on a
generic basis"... . The Commission will be drawn into ponderous
rulemaking. But the most elementary steps to assure public protection
will not be taken. An all too familiar story. 5'
Commissioner Bradford criticized the majority opinion, seeing it as part of
a pattern favoring industry at the expense of public protection 5 ' and fearing
that it would lead to long-lasting safety lapses:
[T]he Commission is telling a Board that has had the foresight to un-
cover "a serious safety matter" . . . that it may not inquire into the mat-
ter further, even though the Board apparently doubts that it has "rea-
sonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be
taken in the event of a radiological emergency." The result of this ac-
tion could easily be an inadequacy in San Onofre emergency planning
that goes unremedied for a long time. 53
Post-Fukushima analysis of reactor oversight shows this very issue to be a
key concern, with new measures requiring licensees to evaluate how seismic ac-
tivity that damages the reactor could also complicate emergency planning.
Whatever motives explain the Commission's choice here-political preference
for centralized control, capture by industry, concern with consistency, or some-
250. Id. at 1095 (Gilinksy, Comm'r, dissenting).
251. Id.
252. Id. (Bradford, Comm'r, dissenting) ("I agree with the views of Commissioner
Gilinsky. In addition, I would note that the Commission has had a number of op-
portunities over the last three years to review on-going proceedings to correct
problems arising from Licensing or Appeal Board decisions.... When it has
stepped into proceedings in progress, it has curtailed investigation of issues unfa-
vorable to the applicant; the Commission has stayed its hand when that action
upholds Board or staff conduct favorable to the applicant. It has rarely required a
Board or the staff to expand safety or environmental considerations. This case
presents an especially unfortunate manifestation of that tendency.").
253. Id.
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thing else-the instrument choice (generic over individual adjudication)
blocked decision-makers' use of relevant information in assessing plant safety.
Courts accepted this issue segregation.25 4
C. Generic Analysis for Relicensing: 1996NEPA Rulernaking
In 1996, the agency finalized NEPA regulations for relicensing that limited
the scope of analysis by generically pre-determining impacts in a broad range of
areas. The regulations divided environmental impacts from relicensing into two
categories. Category 1 included "generic" impacts that the agency determined
would be "the same or similar for all plants."2" ' The regulations precluded li-
censing boards from reviewing analysis of Category i issues in individual reli-
censing proceedings.25 6 The 1996 rule found sixty-nine out of ninety-two envi-
ronmental issues appropriate for generic treatment. 57 Category 2 included the
remaining issues that the NRC acknowledged could have site-specific im-
pacts.2' For these, the NRC required applicants to produce a supplemental en-
vironmental impact statement (SEIS) to address plant-specific impacts. Howev-
er, the applicant need not include information regarding Category i issues. 5 9
The NRC used rulemaking to pre-adjudicate both the nature and the extent
of specific environmental impacts. After categorizing impacts for all generic is-
sues to be either "small," "medium," or "large," the NRC determined that de-
sign-basis and severe accidents would have only "small" environmental im-
pacts.26
254. See, e.g., San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 789
F.2d 786, (D.C. Cir 1986) (en banc) (upholding a subsequent Commission's re-
fusal to consider how earthquakes could complicate emergency planning).
255. 78 Fed. Reg. 37,282, 37,282-83 (2013).
256. 1O C.F.R. §§ 51.71(a), 51.95(c) (limiting challenge to site-specific impacts);
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, supra note 255.
257. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 168, at 14.
258. 1O C.F.R. § 51.53.
259. lo C.F.R. § 51. 71(d); GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 168, at 16 n.33.
260. Environmental Review for Renewal of Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N tbl.B-i (May 29, 1996). Per Limerick, the NRC re-
quired specific plants to consider severe-accident mitigation design alternatives if
they had not previously done so, but nonetheless insisted that accident impacts
would be "small" at all plants. Other notable impacts found to be generic and
small included effects of refurbishment on surface water and ground water quali-
ty; occupational exposures during refurbishment; occupational and public radia-
tion exposure during the license renewal term; onsite storage of spent fuel; low-
level and mixed waste storage and disposal, and decommissioning impacts on wa-
ter quality, ecological resources, and waste management.
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The NRC's NEPA regulations do provide for site-specific evaluation of an
otherwise generic issue if "new and significant information" demonstrates the
need to assess the issue in an individual proceeding.26 ' Notably, as of March
2013, NRC had never found new and significant information sufficient to war-
rant such site-specific review of one of these issues in any of its seventy-three
license renewals to that date.262
This approach to the NEPA process, while ostensibly acknowledging the
potential for changing circumstances to affect earlier decisions, greatly reduces
the likelihood that changing circumstances will be considered when compared
with NEPA best practices. Why? Generally, NEPA places the burden on the
agency to evaluate potential impacts identified during scoping and through
public comments unless the agency can explain why the information is not rele-
vant. Usually, environmental analysts not only anticipate areas of contention in
developing their analysis, but also respond to comments on these issues that can
be brought by other agencies or the public. But a generic rule with potential
supplementation for new and significant information significantly impedes
recognition of new circumstances by reversing the burden, requiring outside
parties (who have the least access to information) to demonstrate the nature of
the information, a highly technical showing. It also deflects the agency's respon-
sibility to search out relevant areas of analysis for the EIS process.
D. Precluding NEPA Analysis: Categorical Exclusions in 2010
As discussed above, NEPA permits agencies to use rulemaking to establish
categories of actions that it finds will normally not have significant environ-
mental impacts and thus to exempt them from NEPA analysis. The NRC de-
fines a categorical exclusion as a "category of actions" which does not require
either an EA or an EIS because it "do[es] not individually or cumulatively have
a significant effect on the human environment and which the Commission has
found to have no such effect." '263 The NRC has progressively expanded its list,
amending its initial rulemaking fourteen times to exclude additional actions
from NEPA analysis.26 4 In 2010, the agency amended its NEPA rules to broaden
the scope of categorical exclusions to include granting a licensee's request for
exemption from licensing requirements "pertaining to the installation or use of
a facility component. "265 While the categorical exclusion applies so long as the
agency determines that the exemption involves "no significant hazard determi-
261. 10 C.F.R. § 51.92(e) (7).
262. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 168, at 19.
263. 1O C.F.R. § 51.14; see also io C.F.R. § 51.22 (discussing NRC procedures for estab-
lishing a categorical exclusion).
264. See Final Rule Amending Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review, 75
Fed. Reg. 20,248, 20,256 (April 19, 2010).
265. Id.
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nation," it reverses the burden by placing the onus on challengers to demon-
strate harm.
The regulations now also exclude from environmental review amendments
and exemptions to some required materials safeguards, including changes to
transportation routes, design revisions for nuclear materials packaging, and
modifications to security and accountability systems. 66 Because these latter
amendments and exemptions are not limited to circumstances with a no signif-
icant hazard determination, staff is not required to make this determination be-
fore issuing the exemption. The agency also entirely exempted from environ-
mental analysis approvals of standard reactor designs and Commision findings
required for operation under combined licenses. 67
IV. FAILURE TO LEARN: A TALE OF Two CHOICES
This Part discusses two NRC decisions-013 updates to NEPA regulations
and the environmental analysis of the agency's updated Waste Confidence De-
cision-that show that a culture of nuclear power promotion continues to over-
shadow other concerns, even after the Fukushima accident. The discussion then
turns back to agency expertise, arguing that despite the apparently scientific na-
ture of the NRC's judgments, more rigorous judicial review would be beneficial.
A. Post-Fukushima Update to NEPA Regulations
The NRC finalized revised NEPA regulations in 2013. The updated regula-
tions reorganize the analysis but largely retain the heavy reliance on generic de-
terminations."s The NRC continues to assert that relicensing will cause only
generic impacts-regardless of reactor type, location, operating history, site
specific external hazards-for numerous issues, including both design-basis ac-
cidents and severe accidents. 69 It continues to assert that the impact of reactor
accidents is "small."2 70
Public comments and NRC responses reflect conflict over how the NEPA
analysis should address hazards and accident risk. After noting that "many
commentators wanted seismic issues to be included in the rule and pointed out
266. See io C.F.R. § 51.22.
267. Id.
268. 78 Fed. Reg. 37,282, 37,285 (2013). See NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, NUREG-
1437 Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants
7.2.2 (June 2013). The new regulations shifted a few impacts from Categories 1 and
2. One important change now requires site-specific analysis of groundwater im-
pacts given discovery of leaked radioactive contamination at several sites.
269. NUREG-1437, supra note 175, at 2-15 tbl.2.1-1.
270. Id.
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the importance of reassessing seismic conditions in determining the safety of
operating nuclear power plants,"27' the agency rejected these requests:
The NRC agrees with the industry commenters that consideration of
seismic conditions is an ongoing safety issue... seismology was not
identified as a separate issue in the revised GEIS because the NRC con-
sidered historical risk rate data for each of their power plants when the
plant was first licensed. The NRC requires all licensees to take seismic
hazards into account in order to maintain safe operating conditions at
all nuclear power plants. When new seismic hazard information be-
comes available, the NRC evaluates the new data and models to deter-
mine if any changes are needed at existing plants. This continuous
oversight process, which includes seismic safety, remains separate from
license renewal and takes place on an ongoing basis at all licensed nu-
clear facilities.
72
The statement that ongoing oversight sufficiently addresses seismic risk
rings hollow in light of the post-Fukushima review. According to the NRC, it is
unnecessary to evaluate the earthquake risk upon relicensing because the
Commission already concluded that the risk is small. Notably, this determina-
tion was based on analysis at forty-four nuclear plants without consideration of
the unique circumstances at the other fifty-six operating plants.27 3 Moreover, it
misses the chance to integrate earthquake risk with other issues, such as the ag-
ing of plant components.
The Revised GEIS continues to treat design-basis accidents generically. The
NRC presumes that the initial analysis of design-basis accidents combined with
ongoing aging management sufficiently ensures that relicensing creates no envi-
ronmental impacts beyond those analyzed several decades earlier for initial li-
censing.27 4 The agency therefore dismissed a broad range of comments as out-
271. 78 Fed. Reg. 37,282, 37,287 (2013).
272. Id. ("The revised GEIS explain[s] that geologic and seismic conditions were con-
sidered in the original design of nuclear power plants and a part of the licensing
bases for operating plants. Seismic conditions are attributes of the geologic envi-
ronment that are not affected by continued plant operations and refurbishment
and are not expected to change appreciably during the license renewal term for all
nuclear plants.").
273. NUREG-1437, supra note 175, at 5-2.
274. Id. at 5-1 ("Because of the requirements that continuous acceptability of the con-
sequences and aging management programs be in effect for the period of extend-
ed operation the environmental impacts, as calculated in that DBAs, should not
differ significantly from initial licensing assessments over the life of the plant, in-
cluding the period of extended operation. Accordingly, the design of the plant rel-
ative to the DBAs during the period of extended operation is considered to re-
main acceptable and the environmental impacts of those accidents were not
examined further in the GEIS.").
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side the scope of license renewal, including concerns with emergency prepared-
ness, evacuation, and safety and security at nuclear power plants.
Commentators criticized the agency's analysis of both design-basis and se-
vere accidents. In particular, challengers questioned the agency's generic treat-
ment of accidents and its conclusion that the environmental impact of design-
basis accidents and severe accidents would be "small." The 2013 revised rule
stated that earlier analysis used in the 1996 rulemaking to identify accident im-
pacts as "small" remained valid.2 75 Thus, the agency did not update the analysis
and instead merely incorporated the 1996 information by reference.27 6 By using
generic analysis in NEPA documents, the agency significantly limits the poten-
tial to gather and assemble potentially interrelated information in an EA or EIS
for a specific plant licensing or relicensing proceeding. It also forgoes an oppor-
tunity to assemble analysis and incorporate multiple issues.
Given the reactor omissions identified after Fukushima, why would the
agency continue to avoid NEPA analysis? Analysis by the Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO) suggests that the NRC's overriding concern for li-
censing continued to trump other concerns. Assessing the NRC's conformity
with its NEPA regulations in a May 2013 report to Congress, the GAO critiqued
the NRC for delay in updating environmental review regulations and guid-
ance.277 The Report only evaluated the NRC's compliance with its own proce-
dures, expressly excluding from analysis the substantive quality of environmen-
tal review documents as well as the adequacy of the procedures themselves.78
Nonetheless, the GAO Report provides insight into aspects of the agency's cul-
ture that shape its approach to NEPA.
The GAO identified staff's sense of pressure to expeditiously process licens-
es. Although the NRC initially began complying with its own temporal goals for
revising generic findings and updating relevant regulations and guidance by
seeking comments in 2003, it soon shelved the process for four years "due to...
competing demands on staff resources. 12 79 NRC officials explained to GAO in-
terviewers that "the agency postponed the [NEPA] revision process because it
275. 1O C.F.R. § 51 ("The 1996 GEIS ... discusses the impacts of potential accidents. It
contains a discussion of plant accidents and consequences. This discussion ad-
dresses general characteristics of design basis (and severe) accidents, characteris-
tics of fission products, meteorological considerations, possible exposure path-
ways, potential adverse health effects, avoiding adverse health effects, accident
experience and observed impacts, and emergency preparedness. The revised GEIS
reexamined the information from the 1996 GEIS and concluded that it is still val-
id. Because the information on DBAs has not changed, the revised GEIS does not
repeat the information.").
276. Id.
277. GOv'TACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 13-493, supra note 168.
278. Id. ("GAO did not evaluate the adequacy or substance of NRC reviews or the
quality of the agency's license renewal procedures.").
279. Id. at 16.
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decided that completing the large number of licensing actions under considera-
tions at that time-including 16 license renewal reviews-was a higher priority
than updating the license renewal environmental review regulations. "280
The agency published proposed regulations revising its NEPA regulations
for license renewal in 2009. As the GAO explained, "[a]ccording to NRC offi-
cials, it took the agency 4 years to prepare the proposed revisions due to the un-
usually large number of technical issues that needed review as part of the rule-
making process, the large number of industry and public comments, the
number of guidance documents that needed to be updated, and competing de-
mands on staff resources from additional license renewal reviews. ' '211 Subse-
quently, the agency spent several more years re-evaluating its proposal and ul-
timately sent a rulemaking package to Commissioners in 2012.282 "According to
NRC officials, license renewals were priority work because of the importance of
maintaining a stable and predictable regulatory process for reactor owners seek-
ing timely review and processing of their license renewal applications." '' 3 The
report did not indicate whether staff recognized the irony of postponing revi-
sions to license renewal regulations in order to finalize licenses-without the
benefit of the completed review of technical issues or updated guidance docu-
ments.
B. The Emperor's Clothes: Waste Storage Confidence Update
As discussed above, managing nuclear waste has proven to be one of the
greater challenges in the commercial nuclear program. One third of a nuclear
reactor's fuel must be replaced every two years, leaving highly radioactive spent
nuclear fuel (SNF) that must be safely contained for thousands of years284 Be-
fore it can be safely moved off site, this spent nuclear fuel must first be cooled
for several years in pools of water that absorb heat and block radiation. 85 Main-
taining water levels in these pools is critical to prevent the spent fuel from over-
heating and combusting, as happened during the Fukushima accident. Alt-
hough spent fuel pools adjacent to U.S. reactors were initially designed to
temporarily store spent nuclear fuel for cooling before transport to a permanent
repository, the United States' failure to develop and construct a permanent
storage repository has pressed these pools into use as long-term storage.86
280. Id. at 15-16.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 16.
284. See de Sailan, supra note 127.
285. Id.
286. See New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 681 F.3d 471, 474 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
("Due to the government's failure to establish a final resting place for spent fuel,
SNF is currently stored on site at nuclear plants. This type of storage, optimistical-
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In NEPA review for licensing proceedings, the NRC has approached unre-
solved waste disposal questions by employing optimistic predictions about de-
velopment of a long-term repository to dismiss impacts from on-site pool stor-
age. A year after the Supreme Court's Baltimore Gas decision, the agency
adopted the Waste Confidence Decision rule,"a which generically determines
environmental impacts from storing spent nuclear fuel in these pools. By pre-
determining impacts for all plants through rulemaking, the Commission pre-
cluded individual licensing boards from considering plant-specific information
about on-site storage impacts at dozens of different plants. The 1984 Waste
Confidence Decision relied on findings that combined technical conclusions
with political predictions:
1) safe disposal in a mined geologic repository is technically feasible, 2)
such a repository will be available by 2007-2009, 3) waste will be man-
aged safely until the repository is available, 4) SNF can be stored safely
at nuclear plants for at least thirty years beyond the licensed life of each
plant, and 5) safe, independent storage will be made available if need-
ed.2
88
The Rule explicitly built upon the Table S-3 at issue in Baltimore Gas. Like
that earlier rulemaking, the Waste Confidence Decision relied heavily on the
NRC's predictions regarding political, institutional, and legal outcomes
amongst multiple agencies and governments. The decision identified numerous
institutional issues that could affect the availability of a common federal long-
term repository, including disputes between the federal and state governments,
as well as with Indian tribes."9 Success would also require "an assured funding
mechanism" over the time span of repository development. 90 In addition,
completion would require "an organizational capability for managing the high-
level waste program" either within the DOE or a successor organizations and
clear "establishment of responsibilities" sufficient to develop the repository "in
a reasonable period of time."29 ' The NRC's "expert" judgment regarding storage
safety relied upon the agency's forecasted resolution of these and other institu-
tional and political challenges. 9
ly labeled 'temporary storage,' has been used for decades longer than originally
anticipated.").
287. 49 Fed. Reg. 34,658 (1984).
288. New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 681 F.3d at 475 (summarizing the
Waste Confidence Decision findings).
289. 49 Fed. Reg. 34,658, 34,675 (1984).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. The agency also predicted that a presidential proposal to dismantle the DOE
would not disrupt "sound management and continuity" of the federal waste re-
pository program because "uncertainties regarding the continuity of Federal man-
agement" were reduced by passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act." Id. at 34,677.
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The NRC updated its Waste Confidence Decision in 199o, revising its pre-
dicted date for repository availability to 2025.293 In its 2010 Waste Confidence
Update, the NRC further revised its findings, this time avoiding prediction of a
specific date.294 Instead, the agency concluded that a long-term storage reposi-
tory would be available "when necessary." '2 95 It also revised upwards its original
finding regarding the period of safe on-site waste storage from thirty to sixty
years.2 96 The subordinate conclusion that pool fires were "sufficiently unlikely
as to pose no significant environmental threat"2 97 has been shown to be mistak-
en in light of Fukushima.
In summer 2012, the NRC had a rare legal defeat regarding its use of generic
analysis. In New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, the D.C. Circuit rejected
the NRC's generic determination that waste storage impacts in spent fuel pools
would be insignificant because a federal long-term repository would be availa-
ble "when necessary. '298 Judge Sentelle contrasted the decades-old assumption
of long-term storage with the on-the-ground reality that efforts to develop an
underground repository had thus far failed: "At this time, there is not even a
prospective site for a repository, let alone progress towards construction of
one."
299
The opinion held that NRC's 2010 update to its Waste Confidence Decision
violated NEPA by failing to sufficiently evaluate the rulemaking's environmen-
tal impacts.30 ' The Court rejected the NRC's initial argument that the rulemak-
ing did not even trigger NEPA because it did not approve specific licenses and
consequently was not a major federal action. Rather, the Waste Confidence De-
cision provided the basis for licensing actions; indeed, it was a "pre-determined
'stage' of each licensing decision" because its generic findings would have a pre-
clusive effect in future licensing decisions °.3 1 Significantly, Judge Sentelle recog-
nized that accepting NRC's contrary view would insulate the Update from
NEPA review because generic determinations preclude further analysis in indi-
vidual licensing proceedings. (Indeed, this is the very purpose of the generic
rulemaking.)
Alternatively, the NRC contended that supporting documents could substi-
tute for a NEPA environmental assessment and contained sufficient analysis to
support a finding of no significant impact.302 The Court held that even if the





298. Id. at 475.
299. Id. at 474.
300. Id. at 483.
301. Id. at 476.
302. Id. at 476.
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documents substituted for an EA, they failed to include essential analysis. Spe-
cifically, they did not consider the potential U.S. failure to develop a permanent
repository and consequent risks from long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel in
temporary pools,3"3 such as the increased potential for fires and fuel leaks.3 °4
This decision represents a rare judicial recognition that the NRC's generic
approach to NEPA insulates future discretionary decisions from information
and that such lost information could undermine agency understanding of sub-
stantive safety issues. Critically, the court did not need to second-guess any
complex expert scientific analysis to conclude that the NEPA consideration was
insufficient. Rather, it merely observed the practical reality that a waste reposi-
tory has not been built and that the most recent plans had dissolved amidst le-
gal and political conflict.
While cynics may not be surprised to learn that the Commission did not
embrace the opportunity to scientifically reevaluate the issue on remand, this
disconnect between the law and actual practice should affect our thinking about
the need for more rigorous judicial review. Unfortunately, the Commission's
response rejected the central purpose of performing NEPA analysis: to inform
decision-makers so that they can better analyze the merits of discretionary ac-
tions.
Instead, the Commissioners largely treated the ruling as an impediment to
what they saw as the NRC's core function: licensing. The Commissioners or-
dered staff to review the Waste Confidence Decision on a timeframe no longer
than 24 months and produce an EIS "to support an updated Waste Confidence
Decision and temporary storage rule."3 5 Thus, the Commission had predeter-
mined the result of the expert analysis. As it saw the problem, the Commission
needed to produce an EIS that satisfied the court's requirements. Instead of us-
ing scientific expertise to better analyze and understand environmental impacts,
the Commission deployed legal resources, including "the most accomplished
NEPA practitioners,"3 6 to support confidence in waste storage.
The Commission's determination of an overriding goal to promote effi-
cient licensing is apparent in its admonition to staff to avoid getting bogged
down in site-specific analysis for individual licenses while developing the gener-
ic EIS. Instead, staff should use site-specific analysis only where it finds "an ex-
ceptional or compelling need to proceed.., with the site-specific review [and
where it] would not delay or create inconsistencies with development of the ge-
neric EIS."3 °7 While an agency's preference for efficient regulatory tools makes
303. Id. at 473.
304. Id. at 479.
305. See Commission Memorandum to R.W. Borchardt, Executive Director for Oper-
ations, Comsecy-12-ool6, Approach For Addressing Policy Issues Resulting From
Court Decision To Vacate Waste Confidence Decision And Rule (Sept. 6, 2012)
(emphasis added).
3o6. Id.
307. Id. (emphasis added).
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sense, predetermination of the outcome of studies undermines the very purpose
of deferring to expertise. Similarly, the admonition to avoid individualized
analysis constrains the experts in service of a foregone conclusion.
C. Reconsidering Deference to Expertise
This Article contends that in the NRC's case, judicial deference has not im-
proved reliance on scientific expertise, but rather has allowed the agency to lim-
it the information available to decision-makers, exclude the public, and shift the
balance between competing demands. While two cases discussed here, New
York and Limerick, show rare courtroom defeats for the agency, this more
searching review will likely be required on a repeated basis for sustained change
to occur.
At first blush, the NRC appears to be the paradigmatic candidate for ex-
tremely deferential review. First, the agency's authorizing statute gives it wide
latitude to fill in general congressional mandates; the AEA explicitly prohibits
private enforcement of regulations against licensees." 8 Moreover, public partic-
ipation is limited by statute; the Act allows some forms of public participa-
tion,0 9 but within narrow parameters. ° Finally, because the NRC regulates
technically complex nuclear power plants, its decisions may be presumed to re-
quire technical expertise of the kind that generalist judges would not be ex-
pected to possess. 31'
Generally speaking, well-recognized and seemingly sensible arguments
support judicial deference to agency expertise on policymaking matters. Con-
3o8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2271(c) (2012) ("No action shall be brought against any individual
or person for any violation under this chapter ... except by the Attorney General
of the United States: Provided, however, that nothing in this subsection shall be
construed as applying to administrative action taken by the Commission."); see
also Simmons v. Ark. Power Light Co., 655 F.2d 131, 134 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding
that the Atomic Energy Act "preclude[s] private judicial enforcement of the Act").
In Simmons, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action
brought by residents living near a reactor in Pope County, Arkansas who had sued
the plant operators for venting from the containment building radioactive gases
created by a malfunction. The operators acted with NRC approval but contrary to
a request for a 48-hour delay from the Director of the Arkansas Department of
Health to assess health impacts. 655 F.2d at 133.
309. See Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring the NRC to
provide a hearing "upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected
by the proceeding").
310. See supra Section III.A.
311. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 25, at 230 ("Courts' deference to these decisions rests in
large part on the assumption that agencies are much better positioned to exercise
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gress lacks the time and knowledge to perform the functions provided by mod-
ern administrative agencies.312 In particular, nuclear power oversight requires
highly technical expert knowledge to create appropriate technical standards.
The complex nature of hazards associated with modem technology also pro-
vides a reasonable rationale for leaving policy judgments regarding risk to ex-
perts; lay members of the public often poorly understand risk generally and
overestimate certain types of risks.3 At the same time, if courts habitually defer
to particular agencies, this "super-deference" 3 4 can habituate those agencies to
lax review, thereby undermining the potential decision-making benefits that
modern process can provide.
While the authorizing statute's structure and agency expertise support def-
erence to the NRC, consideration of potential decision-making errors pushes in
the opposite direction and counsels for caution. Some of the very reasons that
the courts defer so heavily to the NRC warrant more rigorous scrutiny. The
highly technical basis of NRC decision-making limits staff to parties with specif-
ic training and further limits the range of public entities that can meaningfully
comment on NRC activities. This latter limitation is exacerbated by statutory
limits on participation in proceedings (as opposed to environmental statutes
with private attorney general provisions) and reliance on one agency to enforce
regulatory limits. Moreover, the range of perspectives is further limited because
the NRC regulates a specific industry with a single predominant representative,
the Nuclear Energy Institute. Finally, as an independent agency, the NRC is
subject to less official oversight than executive agencies, a fact that may warrant
heightened judicial scrutiny of decisions in and of itself.3"5 To the extent agency
staff and policymakers suffer from expert overconfidence and tunnel vision, the
limited range of viewpoints stemming from this structural insularity can com-
pound the impact on decision-making. In light of these concerns, comparative
institutional expertise becomes far less important for assessing the merits of
312. Stewart, supra note 56, at 1695-96 ("Detailed legislative specification of policy
would require intensive and continuous investigation, decision, and revision of
specialized and complex issues. Such a task would require resources that Congress
has, in most instances, been unable or unwilling to muster.... Moreover .... one
may question whether a legislature is likely in many instances to generate more
responsible decisions on questions of policy than agencies.").
313. See Timur Kuran & Cass Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 736 (1999) (describing how the lay public understanding of risk
can be distorted and urging policymakers to "to discount regulatory demands
rooted in availability cascades based on false information, [and] to pay special at-
tention to trained experts who have had time to put claims in perspective").
314. See Meazell, supra note 136.
315. Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm with Teeth: Heightened Judicial Review in The
Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589, 16o6 (2014) (arguing that
certain types of fact-based independent agency actions should be subjected to
more stringent review because they have not been vetted by executive oversight").
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deference. Judicial review can improve decision-making not because of judges'
substantive knowledge but rather because the very process of being observed
and having to explain itself improves the agency's understanding.' 6
NEPA offers potential antidotes with procedures that integrate analysis of
multiple areas into one document (reducing the risk of issue segregation), re-
quire analysis of alternatives, and incorporate public participation. Participa-
tion introduces new perspectives, lowers the risk that cognitive biases will un-
dermine agency decisions, and can provide technical support as well as infor-
information about local conditions. While scholars tout the democracy-
enhancing quality of public participation,"7 this Article focuses on its capacity
to improve expert analysis. In addition to counteracting cultural and cognitive
biases, public participation can highlight omissions in scientific and engineering
analysis, remind the agency of the limits of prediction under uncertainty, and in
some cases even provide valuable technical information. This latter benefit is
particularly evident in participation by sophisticated parties-such as state at-
torneys general, the Union of Concerned Scientists, local governments, or nu-
clear engineers themselves-who support their claims with scientific documents
and expert analysis. In the NRC's case, public participation and judicial review
are valuable because they can actually make the agency work better.
No doubt there is a point of diminishing return with public participation.
It can be inefficient, particularly when it bogs agencies down with low-quality
information or requires time-consuming public meetings, hearings, or other
processes. Nonetheless, general rules of administrative law and the NEPA have
embraced a model of decision-making that envisions public participation.
While the legal rules give agencies some flexibility to design public participation
rules in a manner that balances competing demands, the NRC has struck the
balance heavily against participation. This approach violates the spirit, if not the
letter, of NEPA and undermines NRC decision-making.
Critically, while NEPA analysis can be time consuming, it does not substan-
tively limit agency choice; thus, increased judicial enforcement of its decision-
making mechanism does not require judges to substitute their analysis for that
of the experts, but rather only to ensure that the experts have considered the
matter. Judicial review is no doubt an imperfect oversight method, subject to
numerous flaws, including the potential for causing ossification. Moreover, be-
cause courts review agency actions individually (e.g., a challenge to a specific
hearing procedure or regulation), courts will likely overlook synergies between
different agency procedures, such as the interaction between the NRC's hearing
procedures and NEPA rules. An agency's conformity with theoretical goals of
administrative law (public participation, reasoned analysis, efficiency) may be
undermined by the interaction between rules that individually pass judicial
muster.
316. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 70.
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DECISIONS, DISASTERS, AND DEFERENCE
While to some extent the Commission's response to the D.C. Circuit shows
the limits of judicial oversight, the NRC's unresponsiveness may stem in part
from years of extreme deference. Moreover, the end of the Waste Confidence
story has yet to unfold. Even if the Commission's outcome-oriented analysis
prevails in this instance, some judicial checking function is certainly better than
none.
Yet this example also suggests that correcting agency pathologies may re-
quire more than changing standards of review, an issue to be taken up in subse-
quent work.' One could certainly imagine more dramatic suggestions: a new
agency, a new statute, or even a new Congress. But one starting place for think-
ing about this could be to ask: should we solve the tension between competing
societal goals by giving an agency conflicting mandates and then turning a blind
eye while it jettisons some statutory requirements in favor of others? Does it
make a difference if the risks are substantial and one of the slighted policies af-
fects public safety? If actually doing thorough analysis to support nuclear power
plant licensing and relicensing would take so long as to make it unappealing to
private investors, that does not necessarily mean that the right answer is to
simply tell the agency to hurry up.
While hard look review cannot answer these questions, it can serve a gap-
filling function while they are analyzed. As Richard Stewart explained forty-
years ago in his comments on Vermont Yankee: "Until Congress comes to grips
with problems it has delegated to administrators or until some alternative
mechanism for oversight of administrative discretion is developed, we must
continue to rely upon judicial review to ensure that agency decisions adequately
deal with the societal impacts of alternative choices and have a sound eviden-
tiary and analytic basis."319
CONCLUSION
While courts recognize that agencies make value-laden policy choices that
differ from a neutral form of "pure" science,32 legal doctrine nonetheless pre-
318. At the same time that this Article identifies regulatory failures, it is also worth no-
ticing aspects of NRC governance that appear to be going right and can aid fur-
ther efforts to understand and improve the agency. The NRC does engage in an
internal regulatory learning process-through such mechanisms as the Task Force
and review of the effectiveness of prior rules-that creates internal momentum
for improvement. The candidness of the Task Force members, all managers from
within the agency, demonstrates serious commitment to improve the agency. Fi-
nally, the availability of sources for this research illustrates transparency that can
facilitate further understanding of agency processes. Nonetheless, these positive
factors do not diminish the need for more reform.
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sumes that these values will stem from statutory directives3 21 and that decision-
making will follow an informed, reasoned, and participatory process. Judicial
deference to agencies presumes that scientific expertise implies procedural wis-
dom. Besides overlooking their lack of administrative training, trans-
substantive visions of administrative law ignore the culture and structure of the
institutions in which agency experts perform their work. In the NRC's case, the
deference stance intended to allow scientifically-informed judgment has in fact
undermined the process. If they merely glance at administrative decisions and
presume (rather than ensure) that agencies rely upon relevant analysis, courts
will fail to check overly optimistic, pressured, or outcome-oriented administra-
tors. To the extent judicial deference relies on a vision of expertise-informed
agency judgment that is not in fact occurring, this mismatch requires our atten-
tion.
This study of the NRC has examined some of the substantive consequences
of the NRC's policy judgments and procedural choices. While the agency war-
rants much further research, my hope is that this Article can contribute to a
process-proposed by Professor Jerry Mashaw-of interrogating agencies' in-
ternal workings with the aim of ultimately proposing improvements in this "in-
visible" aspect of administrative law:
To the extent that we are interested in the reform of administrative law
in the United States, we might do better to operate on the internal law
of administration. My hope is that administrative lawyers can be con-
vinced to look beyond judicial doctrine and the transsubstantive re-
quirements of the external administrative law to see how administra-
tive law really functions at the agency level and how it might be im-
improved.32
Even at this initial phase, however, this study has revealed that what we
thought we knew about administrative law-that searching judicial review nec-
essarily undermines agency expertise-might need to be substantially revised.
321. See Mass. v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 532-33 (2007) (rejecting the
EPA's reasons for refusing to regulate greenhouse gases as "divorced from the
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tory limits").
322. Mashaw, supra note 19, at 992.
33:323 2015
